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REFLECTION ON SHALE GAS FRACKING RISK 









Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, is the current technology of choice 
for developing most shale gas reserves. This technology allows increased 
production of natural gas from formerly inaccessible shale formations. 
One of the primary environmental impacts of concern for fracking is its 
potential to contaminate water. 
This paper focuses on the potential risks affecting the drinking-water 
resources throughout the complete lifecycle of a drilled and fractured 
well. Given the significant environmental concerns, fracking risk 
assessment (what we know about the risk), and fracking risk 
management (what we wish to do about the risk) appear to be 
indispensable steps for the enactment of any environmental statute or 
regulation addressing such high-stake environmental problems and 
public concerns. 
     The federal government currently exempts most fracking activities 
from regulation, and therefore, states remain free to regulate practices as 
they see fit. This has resulted in a patchwork of state regulations, where 
 
* Yosra Abid is a California-qualified attorney and graduate of New York University 
(NYU) School of Law, with an LLM in Environmental and Energy Law (2018). Yosra 
Abid can be contacted at abid.yosraa@gmail.com. 
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each state enacts various requirements for wastewater disposal, 
underground injection, water supply acquisition, drilling, casing, and 
operating wells. The various state fracking regulations fall along a 
spectrum from outright statewide bans to laissez-faire approaches. This 
paper includes a comparative analysis of state fracking regulations in 
three states in the United States: New York, Texas, and Illinois. 
Having demonstrated the shortcomings of the current state-centric 
system regulating the shale gas fracking, the present paper advances 
forward both structural and substantive changes to enhance fracking risk 
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INTRODUCTION 
While the United States’ demand for natural gas is rising1 and its 
production of conventional natural gas is decreasing,2 the temptation of 
applying a breakthrough technology allowing access to trillions of cubic 
feet of shale gas3 appears understandably irresistible.4 A technological 
innovation turned the United States from a net importer of natural gas 
only a decade ago into the world’s third largest liquefied natural gas 
exporter and the world’s largest natural gas producer.5 This technological 
innovation consists of a combination of extraction techniques for 
unconventional natural gas (or shale gas), namely the hydraulic 
 
1 “US gas demand has been steadily rising from 1980s… in 2009, the EIA Annual Energy 
outlook predicted that natural gas demand in the United States could reach 24.36 Tcf by 
the year 2030,” Fang-Yu Liang, Marta Ryvak, Sara Sayeed, and Nich Zhao, The role of 
natural gas as a primary fuel in the near future, including comparisons acquisition, 
transmission and waste handling costs of as with competitive alternatives, NCBI  (April 
23, 2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3332260/. 
2 “Conventional natural gas production in the United States has fallen over the past 
decade by about 14 billion cubic feet per day.” QER Report: Energy Transmission, 
Storage and Distribution Infrastructure U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 7 (2015), 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/09/f26/QER_AppendixB_NaturalGas.pdf. 
3 There are over 827 tcf of recoverable shale gas reserves in the US. Shale Gas: Applying 
to Solve America’s Energy Challenges, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 4 (2011), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=8711. 
4 “[…] the shale gas production in the United States has grown more than tenfold from 
2.7 BCf/d in January 2004 to about 35.0 Bcf/d in May 2014 […] shale gas accounts for 
about half of overall gas production in the Unites States,” see QER Report: Energy 
Transmission, Storage and Distribution Infrastructure, supra note 2, at 7. 
5 David B. Spence, Responsible Shale Gas Production: Moral Outrage vs. Cool Analysis, 
25 FORDHAM ENV’T. L. REV. 141, 141 (2013).; “Enabled by new technology, especially 
the combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, in the US natural gas 
industry has undergone unprecedented changes over the past 8 years,” see also QER 
Report, supra note 2, at 6; “Less than a decade ago, with natural production on the 
decline, the United States was expected to become a major importer of liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) and a last resort market for surplus cargos around the world. But today, thanks 
to an increase in shale gas output, the United States is poised to become a significant 
supplier of gas to international markets,” Lisa Viscidi, Carlos Sucre & Sean Karst, 
Natural Gas Market Outlook: How Latin America and the Caribbean Can Benefit from 
the US Shale Boom, THE DIALOGUE: LEADERSHIP FOR THE AMERICAS, 1 (2015); The US is 
the current third largest exporter of LNG. Elizabeth Caldwell, Report: The United States 
will be The World’s Top LNG exporter in the Next Five Years, Energy in Depth (2019), 
https://www.energyindepth.org/report-the-united-states-will-be-the-worlds-top-lng-
exporter-in-the-next-five-years/; The US is the largest producer of natural gas thanks to 
shale gas production: “The United States surpassed Russia in 2011 to become the world’s 
largest producer of natural gas […],” U.S. Energy Info. Admin., The US Leads Global 
Petroleum and Natural Gas Production with Record Growth in 2018 (2019), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=40973. 
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fracturing technique (also commonly known as fracking) and the 
horizontal drilling technique.6 
Fracking is currently the most commonly used technology for the 
development of shale gas reserves.7 This technology has allowed the 
growing output of natural gas from otherwise unreachable shale 
formations.8 To let trapped natural gas out, artificial fractures need to be 
created. To this end, wells are pumped down with highly pressurized 
water, tracers, chemical additives, and proppants.9 
For the purposes of this paper, fracking refers to the whole process 
allowing the extraction of natural gas from an unconventional formation. 
This process consists of three-fold stages: 1) exploration, 2) extraction 
operations, and 3) disposal of the operations-generated wastes.10 First, at 
the exploration stage, there should be tests conducted to determine the 
existence of natural gas in a given site.11 Second, after obtaining requisite 
drilling permits, if any, the operator starts the construction of the well 
site and begins drilling.12 Drilling, in unconventional formations, reaches 
thousands of feet vertically before it continues horizontally.13 This means 
that fracking drills not only occur beneath the conventional gas reserves, 
but also, more likely than not, below underground drinking-water 
supplies.14 Drilling operations cause natural water, known as “produced 
water,” in addition to drilling mud to rise in significant quantities from 
the formation through the well to the surface.15 Next, the operator injects 
millions of gallons of water at high pressure along with chemicals and 
proppants into the well to hydraulically fracture the formation.16 The use 
of pressure is essential for the creation of perforations in the well, 
allowing chemicals and proppants to penetrate the rock.17 The following 
stage consists in storing the water and chemicals, which return through 
the well to the surface, and are referred to as “flow-back water.” Placed 
 
6  D. Spence, supra note 5, at 147-8. 
7 James W Adams, Craig D. Stocker & Nicholas R. Lawson, Emerging Centrifugal 
Technology in Shale Hydraulic Fracturing Waste Management: A U.S. –France-China 
Selected Environmental Comparative Analysis, 34 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 561, 562 (2012). 
8 D. Spence, supra note 5, at 141. 
9 Joanne Hawkins, Fracking: Minding the Gaps, 17 ENV’T. L. REV. 8, 9 (2015). 
10 Michael Burger, The (Re)Federalization of Fracking Regulation, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 




14 Id; see also Michael N. Mills & Robin B. Seifried, What is Fracking Wastewater and 
How Should We Manage it, 28 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 9, 10–11 (2014). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 1493. 
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in a pit or tank, flow-back water will then be disposed of or reused.18 The 
operator generally opts for one of three methods to dispose of the 
wastewater resulting from the fracking operations: 1) either through 
underground injection into a separate disposal well, 2) through discharge 
into a water treatment plant, or 3) through land application.19 The final 
stage of shale gas extraction consists of plugging and abandoning the 
well at the end of its life.20  
The various stages of this process give rise to numerous risks, 
notably risks for “air pollution,” water contamination, “hazardous waste 
spills,” toxic chemical leaks, and increasing greenhouse emissions at the 
site of extraction.21 The various stages of the process, notably the 
transport, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste and toxic chemicals, 
are likely to cause toxic chemicals to spread to underground water 
supplies through surface and subsurface channels.22  
The most contentious phase of the shale gas extraction is drilling 
wastewater management.23 This concern primarily reflects pollution risks 
such as methane gas leaks, fluid migration through created fractures into 
the groundwater, and surface spills from deficiently constructed wells.24 
Additionally, it is of particular concern the volume of water used for 
purposes of fracking.25 For instance, Barnette Shale26 wells use four to 
 
18 Id. 
19 M. Mills & R. Seifried, supra note 14, at 9-10. 
20 M. Burger, see supra note 10, at 1493. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 see generally M. Mills & R. Seifried, supra note 14. 
24 J. Hawkins, see supra note 9, at 10. 
25 The supply of freshwater required is approximately 15,000 m3 during the entire 
fracturing process into a well, see J. Hawkins, supra note 9, at 11. 
26 “The Barnette shale is a geological formation and rich source of natural gas located in 
the Fort Worth Basin in Northeast Texas. The shale consists of sedimentary rock made of 
clay and quartz and spans 5,000 square miles, beneath about 18 North Texas counties. The 
productive portion of the rock formation is located directly beneath Johnson, Tarrant and 
western Dallas counties, about a mile and a half underground. The shale contains an 
estimated 40 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, making it the largest onshore natural gas field 
in Texas and potentially in the United States.” What is the Barnett Shale?, STATE IMPACT: 
TEXAS (Aug. 24, 2020), https://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/tag/barnett-shale/. 
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five million gallons of fresh water per well, and Eagle Ford27 wells use 
close to thirteen million gallons per well.28  
That said, this paper focuses on the potential risks affecting the 
drinking-water resources throughout the complete lifecycle of a drilled 
and fractured well.  On-site storage and disposal of fracking wastewater 
pose contamination risk to both ground water and surface water, the two 
sources of drinking water.29 Ground water is “water located beneath the 
earth’s surface, such as an aquifer, and surface water is water exposed to 
the atmosphere such as lakes, rivers, and ponds.”30 Consequently, this 
paper identifies the potential threats to water resources, including 
contamination from chemical spills, improper fracking wastewater 
storage and disposal, in addition to methane releases during the drilling 
and fracturing stages. 
Given the significant environmental concerns, the fracking risk 
assessment (what we know about the risk) and the fracking risk 
management (“what we plan to do about the risk”) appear to be 
indispensable steps for the enactment of any environmental statute or 
regulation addressing such scale of environmental problems and public 
concerns.31 The primary objective of risk assessment is “to estimate the 
likelihood and the severity of harm to human health and the environment 
occurring from exposure to a risk agent.”32 Risk management is defined 
as “the process by which the risk assessment is used with other 
information to make regulatory decisions.”33 
Fracking-related risk assessment has therefore been presented as the 
underlying driving force for legislative and regulatory actions at the 
 
27 “The Eagle Ford Shale is a hydrocarbon-producing geological of significant importance 
to its capabilities of producing both natural and also oil than other traditional shale plays. 
The shale play trends across Texas from the Mexican border into the East Texas, roughly 
50 miles wide and 400 miles long with an average thickness of 250 feet with Railroad 
Commission of Texas Districts 1-6.” Eagle Ford Shale Information: What is the Eagle 
Ford Shale?, LEADING TEXAS ENERGY (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/oil-
gas/major-oil-and-gas-formations/eagle-ford-shale-information/. 
28 Rebecca Jo Reser, State and Federal Statutory and Regulatory Treatment of Hydraulic 
Fracturing, 80 DEF. COUNSEL J. 90, 92 (2013). 
29 Kirbie Watson, The Emperor’s New Clothes: Fracking Legislation in Texas, 3 LSU J. 
ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 351, 355 (2014). 
30 Id. 
31 See Dorothy E. Patton, The ABCs of Risk Assessment, 19 EPA J. 10, 10–11 (1993). 
32 John J. Cohrssen & Vincent T. Covello, Risk Analysis: A Guide to Principles and 
Methods for Analyzing Health and Environmental Risks U.S. COUNCIL ON ENV. QUALITY, 
55 (1989). 
33 D. Patton, supra note 32, at 11. 
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federal and state levels.34 Risk assessment is, in fact, a vital decision-
making and priority-identifying instrument in environmental 
regulations.35 Policymakers therefore aim to achieve credibility and 
objectivity for preconceived policy goals by basing legislative and 
regulatory choices on risk assessment findings and outcomes.36 
That said, the present paper will be structured in three main parts: the 
first part generally addresses (I) fracking risk assessment and 
management; the second part examines (II) fracking risk assessment and 
management at the Federal and State levels; while the third part lays 
down a number of (III) suggestions addressing the current regulatory 
shortcomings associated with fracking activities. 
 
I. FRACKING RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 
 
Risk assessment and management are enshrined in legislative and 
regulatory texts governing fracking operations.  
 
A. Risk Assessment 
  
The primary objective of the risk assessment is “to estimate the 
likelihood and the severity of harm to human health and the environment 
occurring from exposure to a risk agent.”37 The National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS) and EPA risk assessment guidelines define risk 
assessment as “the process by which scientific data are analyzed to 
describe the form, dimension, and characteristics of risk–that is, the 
likelihood of harm to humans or the environment.”38 The risk assessment 
process comprises four main phases: “1) hazard identification, 2) dose-
 
34 According to H. Wiseman, where there is risk there must be regulation. Thus, 
regulating depends in large part on the outcome of the risk assessment process. In this 
respect Wiseman states “The absence of regulation is not of great concern if fracking is a 
relatively benign practice that can be sufficiently controlled through the general 
permitting process; but if fracking has significant environmental and public health 
impacts, the lack of regulation is problematic.” Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The 
Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need for Revisit 
Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENV’T. L. REV. 115, 116 (2009). 
35 Bernard D. Goldstein, If Risk Management is Broke, Why Fix Risk Assessment, 19 EPA 
J. 37, 37 (1993); see also discussion about the various studies conducted to determine the 
potential fracking threats on the environment, D. Spence, supra note 5.  
36 Id. 
37 Cohrssen, see supra note 32, at 55. 
38 Dorothy E. Patton see supra note 32, at 11. 
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response relationship, 3) exposure analysis, and 4) risk 
characterization.”39 
After examining (1) fracking risk assessment shortcomings, it seems 
relevant to identify a wide range of (2) assessed risks associated with 
fracking operations. 
 
1. Fracking risk assessment shortcomings 
 
Risk assessment relating to fracking activities can be (a) uncertain 
and controversial, (b) manipulated to serve narrow policy goals, and (c) 
conducted in an environment of scarce data. 
 
a. Risk assessment inherent limitations: uncertainty and 
controversy 
 
It is rare that there is only one answer to an environmental risk 
assessment question.40 This can be illustrated by the controversial risk 
assessment studies undertaken in connection with the shale gas 
development.41  
A 2004 EPA study reached the conclusion that fracking “pose[s] 
little or no threat” to drinking resources.42 This study was not only 
criticized (as it will be further detailed below) for potential political 
interference, but also for being inconsistent with previously and 
subsequently conducted studies by the EPA.43 In fact, the 2004 EPA 
study contradicted a 1987 EPA report which revealed the contamination 
of an underground drinking water source in West Virginia’s shale gas 
 
39 Donald W. Stever, The Use of Risk Assessment in Environmental Law, 14 COLUM. J. 
ENV’T. L. 329, 329 (1989). 
40 “[…] risk assessment means different things to different people – a point that comes 
across in subsequent articles in this issue of EPA Journal – and is thus a source of 
misunderstanding and controversy. Some points of controversy involve the interpretation 
of scientific studies. Others have to do with science policy issues. […]” see D. Patton, 
supra note 32, at 11. 
41 D. Spence see supra note 5, at 160–62. 
42 See EPA, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER 
BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS (2004); see also EPA 
Finding on Hydraulic Fracturing Deemed ‘Unsupportable’, UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS, (Aug. 24, 2020, 4:01 PM), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/epa-findings-
hydraulic-fracturing-deemed-unsupportable. 
43 Id.; “...in 2011, the EPA concluded that fracturing fluids had contaminated a drinking 
water aquifer near the town of Pavilion, Wyoming, though the industry disputes that 
conclusion,” see D. Spence, supra note 5, at 160–61. 
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formation.44 Another EPA study, concluded in 2016, found that fracking 
can contaminate underground drinking water.45 
A 2011 study, conducted at Cornell University, “found a higher 
incidence of methane contamination in drinking-water wells located 
close to natural gas wells.”46 In 2012, with the goal of quantifying the 
risks relating to groundwater contamination, researchers at the State 
University of New York enumerated a variety of accidents that “could 
result in a spill, and extrapolat[ed] from those probabilities to produce 
projected volumes of fracking wastewater that might find their way into 
groundwater or surface waters in the Marcellus Shale.”47 The results of 
the study show that risks are substantial.48 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned studies, a 2011 study conducted 
at Pennsylvania State University showed “no significant increase in well 
contamination from either methane or fracking fluid constituents” after 
gathering samples of drinking water wells “before and after nearby 
fracking operations,”49 On the other hand, in a study known as the “Duke 
Study,” MIT researchers have come to more nuanced conclusions. After 
sampling well water before and after fracking, MIT researchers found 
“no evidence of groundwater contamination by fracking fluids or 
wastewater,” but highlighted that “levels of thermogenic methane were 
higher in shallow groundwater aquifers near natural gas production wells 
than elsewhere in the same aquifers.”50 It is worth mentioning that the 
researchers did not come up with an explanation as to the presence of gas 
drilling in said aquifers.51 Additionally, after comparing “concentrations 
of methane and other constituents in 127 water wells in the Fayetteville 
shale gas production region before and after shale gas production 
operations,” the US Geological Survey, similarly to the above-mentioned 
MIT Study and Pennsylvania State University study, reached the 
 
44 M. Burger, see supra note 10, at 1519. 
45 EPA, HYDRAULIC FRACKING FOR OIL AND GAS: IMPACTS FROM THE HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING WATER CYCLE ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2016), available at 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
12/documents/hfdwa_executive_summary.pdf; see also U.S. EPA. HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING FOR OIL AND GAS: IMPACTS FROM THE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING WATER 
CYCLE ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES (FINAL REPORT). U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, WASHINGTON, DC, EPA/600/R-16/236F, 2016, 
available at https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/hfstudy/recordisplay.cfm?deid=332990. 
46 D. Spence see supra note 5, at 161. 
47 Id. at 162. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 161. 
50 Id. at 161–162. 
51 Id. at 162. 
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conclusion that there was “no evidence of contamination of either 
methane or fracking fluid constituents [in] wells.”52 
 
b. Risk assessment neutrality can be compromised 
 
Should the risk assessment be considered distinctly from risk 
management? Put differently, should we allow politics to influence risk 
assessment? 
The 1983 Red Book report by the National Academy of Science’s 
(NAS) recommended distinguishing risk assessment and risk 
management.53 
The NAS report further stressed that both the scientific and political 
domains significantly influence the risk management process.54 This 
exemplifies how risk assessment “operates in the ambiguous borderland 
between systematic observations of the physical world (“science”) and 
politically accountable decisions about public health and welfare 
(“policy”).”55 
Criticisms addressed to related risk assessment studies illustrate the 
alarming undue influence of politics and industry on these studies’ 
findings. By way of illustration, authors of an earlier published study, 
refuting fracking operations’ impact on methane level in drinking water, 
had financial ties to Chesapeake Energy, a company which owns 
unconventional oil and natural gas assets in top US onshore plays.56  
Furthermore, the accuracy of the EPA’s conclusions was challenged 
in 2015 by its independent scientific advisory panel which asserted that 
the study minimized the risks posed to drinking water by fracking.57 The 
2004 EPA’s report, which reached the conclusion that fracking “posed 
little or no threat” to drinking water resources, was deemed flawed after 
establishing conflicts of interest among the majority of the seven-
member Peer Review Panel.58 As a result, an investigation into the 
 
52 Id. 




56 Curtis Morrison, Fracker in the Rye: The Necessity of Federal Fracking Waste 
Regulation and a Fracking Waste Regulatory Commission, 37 WHITTIER L. REV. 87, 102 
(2015); see also About, CHESAPEAKE ENERGY, (Aug. 24, 2020, 4:08 PM) 
http://www.chk.com/about. 
57 Id. 
58 M. Burger see supra note 10, at 1519. 
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impact of political influence on the study was commenced by the EPA 
Inspector General.59 
In 2010 an EPA study on the potential for fracking to contaminate 
the drinking-water supplies began.60 Although completion of the study 
was intended for 2014, it was not concluded until 2016.61 Great attention 
was placed on this EPA study because it was aimed to confirm or refute 
the 2004 EPA’s conclusions, which found “no conclusive evidence” 
showing that fracking has impacts on drinking-water.62 During that time, 
President Obama openly praised fracking, considering it the reason 
behind achieving the US energy independence, the growth of the 
economy, and bringing down the levels of greenhouse gases.63 It is 
noteworthy that in 2013, the US became the world's largest oil and gas 
producer, thereby reducing imports to levels unseen in over a decade.64 
Within the same context, the president of the US Chamber of Commerce 
expressly warned that the EPA study on drinking water “could short-
circuit America’s absolute explosion in energy opportunity that is 
creating millions of jobs.”65 Such excessive attention to the 2014 EPA 
study raised an enormous amount of criticism.66 Such focus on the study 
was deemed as “enormous political pressure,” interfering with the risk 
assessment neutrality, and undermining future credibility in risk 
assessment.67 
 
c. Risk assessment conducted in an environment of scarce data  
 
Lax fracking regulations are at the origin of fracking-data gaps and 
absence of reporting requirements. Risk assessment tools (e.g. predictive 
models) have purposefully been omitted in statutes and regulations 
governing fracking activities.68 Predictive models are one of the risk-
 
59 Id. 
60 The politics of fracking, THIS WEEK (Aug. 24, 2020), 
https://theweek.com/articles/451472/politics-fracking;  
61 Id.; see also U.S. EPA. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING FOR OIL AND GAS: IMPACTS FROM THE 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING WATER CYCLE ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES IN THE UNITED 
STATES (FINAL REPORT). U.S. EPA, supra note 46. 
62 See supra section II. A “The Federal Oversight.”  
63 See The politics of fracking, supra note 61. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 M. Burger supra note 10, at 1533. 
67 Id. 
68 “Rather than using their statutory authority to evaluate potential environmental impacts 
from shale gas extraction proposals, most states’ permitting of oil and gas development 
have stuck to a traditional role: require minimum well construction standards setbacks, and 
a process from groundwater supply replacement. This approach differs dramatically from 
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assessment tools used to measure any potential harm that might be 
caused by the fracking operations.69 Predictive models also allow 
permitting authorities (risk management authorities) to play a risk 
assessment role at an early stage of the fracking process, i.e. as early as 
the permitting stage.70 Simply put, the predictive model-based approach 
ensures that a scientific assessment of potential risks and the operation 
outcomes be predicted at the early stage of permitting, before the 
inception of the operations.71 As a result, the predictive models are 
deemed to be the best analytical devices available for regulatory agencies 
to evaluate potential impacts of a proposed activity during the permitting 
process.72 
Additionally, collection of baseline data gathered before drilling can 
provide evidence about whether methane in nearby groundwater 
originates from drilling or is already present beforehand.73 In this 
context, under the Illinois’ Hydraulic Fracking Regulatory Act, fracking 
operators are bound to undertake baseline water sampling before 
engaging in any fracking activities.74 Consequently, in light of collected 
data, permitting authorities would make well-informed decisions as to 
whether and under what conditions to issue fracking-related permits.75 
The EPA’s Progress Report and the 2016 final report on its Study of 
the Potential Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing on Drinking Water 
Resources confirm that these models are available for use in shale gas 
development permitting.76 
Last but not least, by absolving fracking operators of disclosure 
obligation, trade secrets laws impede access to important fracking data 
such as fracking fluids’ chemical composition.77 
 
the predictive model -based approach of permitting underground injection control wells,” 
see Emily A. Collins, Permitting Shale Gas Development, 29 J. LAND USE & ENV’T. L. 117, 
118 (2013). 
69 Id. at 119. 
70 Id. at 126. 
71 Id. 
72 “[…] the state agencies have not incorporated necessary information gathering into their 
permitting rules and processes to use predictive modeling, which is the best evidence, in 
deciding whether, and under what conditions, to issue a gas development permit,” Id. at 
143. 
73 K. Watson, supra note 30, at 357. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 142. 
76 See 2016 EPA Study, supra note 46. 
77 “Currently, there is no federal law regulating fracking. Instead, fracking is only regulated 
under state law. Public disclosure requirements vary widely from state-to-state. Some states 
have no disclosure requirements at all. Of the states that do, most have included trade secret 
exception provisions allowing oil and gas companies to refuse to disclose the chemicals 
13
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d. Assessed fracking risks 
 
There are environmental risks associated with any oil and gas 
production sites. However, there are some additional risks specifically 
associated with shale gas fracking operations. This paper focuses 
essentially on fracking operations’ impacts on water resources.  
One of the unique features of fracking operations is the 
transportation, storage, and use of significant quantities of water.78 Risk 
assessment studies revealed the potential risk of groundwater 
contamination due to fracking fluids’ underground injection throughout 
the hydraulic fracturing process.79 To store the fracking fluids, operators 
generally use “the purpose-built ponds or ‘frack tanks’ set at the drilling 
location.”80 The natural formation pressure causes a large quantity of the 
fracking fluids injected into the wells to return to the surface, which is 
known as “flow-back water.”81 Said flow-back water is also stored in 
frack tanks or purpose-built ponds at the drilling site.82 These ponds pose 
risks of environmental damage both at short and long terms.83 For 
instance, a storm may cause the contamination of nearby land and water 
sources if the concentration of additives is sufficiently high in the stored 
flow-back waters.84 Shallow aquifers, soils, and shallow groundwater are 
also at the danger of slow releases emanating from the ponds.85 Another 
risk consists in the likelihood of releases from the vertical casings86 of 
these wells, impacting shallow aquifers with either fracking fluid or 
recovered methane.87 
 
they use in fracking. More importantly, very few state laws that have trade secret 
exceptions also require that the company provide any substantiation that the trade secret is 
legitimate. Without some kind of uniform factual substantiation requirement, what is to 
keep oil and gas companies from abusing trade secret exceptions?” See Melanie 
McCormick, Conflicting Theories at Play: Chemical Disclosure and Trade Secrets in the 
New Federal Fracking Regulation, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. ENV’T. L. J. 217, 218 (2016). 
78 Thomas Swartz, Hydraulic Fracturing: Risks and Risk Management, 26 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 30, 30 (2011). 
79 See H. Wiseman, supra note 34, at 137-38, 184. 
80 T. Swartz see supra note 79, at 31. 
81 Id. at 30 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 31. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 “Typical well construction includes the use of numerous casings, starting with the largest 
“conductor casing” used to stabilize the shallow soils while drilling the well. The next 
casing is the surface casing used to establish a seal between the borehole and the shallow 
formations, which may include shallow and freshwater aquifers,” Id. 
87 Id. 
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One additional risk to the shallow aquifers occurs during the 
completion of the wells.88 This is when the fracking process opens up 
new fractures that would communicate with existing fractures in the 
overburden, allowing the communication between the deep gas-bearing 
zone and the shallow drinking-water aquifers.89 
Another significant risk consists of the loss of “flow-back” water 
from the production site.90 Said flow-back water includes fracking 
chemicals of undetermined and unknown toxicity.91 Surrounding 
farmlands, homesteads, and waterways are particularly vulnerable to this 
risk.92 Similarly, a blowout of a drilling pad would dangerously impact 
the life of a community particularly if the drilling operations are 
occurring in the outskirts of an urban area.93 
The significance of the above-listed risks stresses the need for 
appropriate risk management tools. 
 
2. Risk Management 
 
Risk management is defined as the process by which the risk 
assessment “is used with other information to make regulatory 
decisions.”94 In general, risk management is premised upon studies of 
technological feasibility costs, and on the economic and social 
consequences (e.g. employment impacts) of possible regulatory 
decisions.95 The outcome of the risk assessment coupled with other 
relevant information to risk management are looked at together for 
purposes of making risk management options and environmental 
decisions.96  
Before critically appraising fracking-related risk management in the 









89 Id.; see also D. Spence, supra note 5, at 151.  




94 See D. Patton, supra note 32, at 11. 
95 Id. at 12. 
96 Id. 
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a. Relating risk management to risk assessment 
 
Risk assessors base their judgment on facts that are believed most 
approximate to the “reality.”97 The question that arises here is whether 
the facts of the risk should be assumed independently from the risk 
management considerations or have to derive somehow from the 
concerns of the risk management. The answer to this question depends 
on how conservatively the policy makers are inclined to draw up their 
policies to protect public health and the environment.98 For instance, do 
the policy makers want to eliminate the risks that are unacceptably high 
for some subpopulations or only to reduce those that occur at too high 
frequency for the entire population? Should risk assessment default 
assumptions be set to protect individuals that are the utmost exposed, 
highly vulnerable, or most normal? 
As a result of such complexity in making risk management decisions, 
US states’ policies have varied drastically. For instance, within the 
fracking regulation context, states such as New York99 and Vermont100 
have adopted a statewide outright ban on fracking, while other states like 
Texas101 and Pennsylvania102 opted for more flexible fracking regulations 
and enforcement.  
The ultimate objective of any risk manager, with respect to shale gas 
fracking, is striking a balance between regulating in a way that allows all 
stakeholders (i.e. industry, states, and communities) to reap the benefits 
of shale gas, on one hand, and minimizing the potential for 
environmental degradation on the other.103 
 
 
97 S. Jasanoff, see supra note 54, at 36. 
98 Id. 
99 See D. Spence, supra note 5, at 159. 
100 Id. at 143. 
101  “In no instance in its [Texas’] rules or application to drill does Texas require 
information that would allow the Rail Commission to model the potential for substance 
migration of fluids or methane from gas development operations,” see E. Collins, supra 
note 69, at 132; Texas, like Pennsylvania provides no formal predrilling water testing 
requirement. Nathan Richardson, Madeline Gottlieb, Alan Krupnick & Hannah Wiseman, 
The State of State Shale Gas Regulation, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (2013), 
https://media.rff.org/documents/RFF-Rpt-StateofStateRegs_Report.pdf. 
102 “Pennsylvania’s gas development permitting process does not actively provide room 
for reviewing agency to evaluate and address subsurface migration of gas and 
contaminants prior to development,” see E. Collins, supra note 69, at 137; For instance, 
RFF survey cites Pennsylvania among states that do not formally require predrilling 
water testing before drilling or hydraulic fracturing, see RFF report, Id. at 30. 
103 Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 729, 
738 (2013). 
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b. Critical appraisal of fracking risk management solutions 
 
As fracking industry-derived political and economic benefits are 
undeniable, risk management responses tend in large to (i) accommodate 
these non-environmental competing policy goals. Due to the inherent 
uncertainty attached to risk assessment, risk managers are stepping in to 
overcome such (ii) lack of certainty.  
  
i. Accommodation of non-environmental competing policy 
goals 
 
There is a tough balance to be struck between handling suspected 
adverse effects of fracking on the environment and its spillover benefits 
with respect to the economy and society. Fracking has been praised for 
contributing to the US energy independence, creating new jobs, and 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.104  
Shale gas, extracted in the US, using fracking technology, has been 
presented as a viable economic alternative source of energy toward 
achieving a degree of energy independence.105 Interestingly, thanks to 
shale gas, the US has been leading the global production of natural gas 
after bypassing Russia in 2009.106 President Obama reportedly called 
Pennsylvania the “Saudi Arabia of natural gas” because of the state’s 
shale resource and its potential to enhance US energy independence.107 
At a national level, the extraction of shale gas has been perceived as a 
means to pursue the US paramount interest of energy security and 
independence, putting an end to a longstanding US dependence on the 
Middle East’s energy supplies.108 
Additionally, while as of 2012, the shale gas industry has reportedly 
been the source of 2.1 million jobs, the number is likely to attain 3.3 
million by 2020.109 An $85 billion reduction in the US annual trade 
deficit is attributable to shrinking oil and gas imports.110 
 
104 See The politics of fracking, supra note 61. 
105 Id. 
106 R. Reser, see supra note 29, at 91. 
107“‘We are the Saudi Arabia of natural gas,’ the president said Tuesday,” Eric 
Schwartzel, Obama’s Backing of Shale Gas Aimed at Voters in Marcellus Region, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Jan. 29, 2012), https://www.post-
gazette.com/home/2012/01/29/Obama-s-backing-of-shale-gas-aimed-at-voters-in-
Marcellus-region/stories/201201290240. 
108 Id.; See also Clarissa Bierstedt, What’s the Fracking Problem? Hydraulic Fracturing, 
Silica Sand, and Issues of Regulation, 63 DRAKE L. 639, 643 (2015). 
109 Id. at 644.  
110 Id. 
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At a state level, in Texas, for instance, “oil and gas is big business”, 
as the state’s production of natural gas amounts to “one-fourth of the 
nation’s natural gas.”111 “The oil and gas industry alone accounts for 
14.9% of the state’s gross product, and nearly 312,000 people have jobs 
in the oil and gas industry.”112 
Such remarkable political and economic benefits derived from the 
fracking industry have further complicated the mission of risk managers, 
striving to strike a balance between environmental and public health 
concerns, as well as other competing interests. Risk managers must 
account for concerns that legislative and regulatory developments may 
fall behind the increasingly important economic role of shale gas.113 
From another perspective, risk management responses to the fracking 
potential risks should also be perceived through the lens of industrial 
interests. Governments do not engage in direct investment in, or 
production of, energy; rather, governments try to induce private capital to 
make such investment through regulations (including subsidies) that 
would raise or lower the profitability of the production of given fuels.114 
Therefore, industrial interests tend to lobby policymakers to relax 
energy-related regulations for economic reasons.115 
The decision whether to permit or prohibit shale gas production must 
overcome the temptation of focusing exclusively on the most immediate 
impacts drawn from a cost-benefit analysis. Equal importance should 
rather be accorded to broader impacts of the shale production so that all 
costs and benefits are weighed, and more widely distributed, in the 
longer run.116  
That said, it bears noting that a cost-benefit analysis is a prevalent 
technique, almost systematically used by policymakers, in crafting risk 
management decisions. Proponents of the cost-benefit analysis hold that 
the analysis presents numerous advantages.117 First, it offers economic 
justifications for preconceived regulations, promotes economic 
efficiency, and eliminates “unnecessary and wasteful public and private 
expenditures.”118 Second, cost-benefit analysis contributes to diminishing 
 
111 K. Watson see supra note 30, at 358. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 D. Spence see supra note 5, at 169. 
115 “States also could be inefficiently captured by industry, which benefits from revolving 
door connections to state regulatory bodies and has lobbied heavily against federal 
fracturing regulation.” see H. Wiseman, supra note 104, at 814. 
116 D. Spence see supra note 5, at 169. 
117 Jeremy D. Frailberg & Michael J. Trebilcock, Risk Regulation: Technocratic and 
Democratic Tools for Regulatory Reform, 43 MCGILL, L. J. 835, 858 (1998). 
118 Id. 
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interest-group pressures on regulation by ensuring that the regulations 
are not shrouded in mystery, but are instead made accessible to the lay 
public.119 Nonetheless, cost-benefit analysis presents a number of limits.      
The efficiency of this analysis is contingent on its ability to accurately 
value both costs and benefits of regulating or not regulating involved 
potential risks.120 A fundamental objection to this approach is its attempt 
to place a dollar value on morally and intellectually invaluable things, 
such as human life or harms to the environment (as it does not seem 
moral to place a value judgment on preserving endangered species or 
natural history).121  
Within the context of shale gas development, potential water 
resource contamination and threats to drinking water depletion due to 
fracking’s excessive use of water pose sheer valuation problems. For 
instance, no one can put a price on the availability of clean drinking 
water at home. People rely on clean and plentiful water resources to meet 
their basic needs, including drinking, bathing, and cooking. The 2010 
documentary “Gasland” eloquently illustrated the magnitude of fracking 
impacts on drinking waters.122 In a particularly notable scene, a husband 
and wife were able to ignite the water running from their kitchen faucet 
because of water methane contamination resulting from the alleged 
fracking chemicals leaking into drinking water aquifers.123 Discussing 
the cost-benefit analysis role in shaping fracking related risk 
management decisions is beyond the scope of this paper, however, it 
seems fair in light of the foregoing to say that the analysis raises serious 
criticisms with respect to its valuation techniques and strategies.124 
This paper also argues that the regulatory process should be 
safeguarded from undesirable interference by granting risk assessment 
analysis a priority over interest groups’ pressure. Environmentalists 
express concerns as to the risk management process’s vulnerability and 
susceptibility to overlook risk assessment determinations falling for 
involved industry’s pressure.125 For instance, in the 1980’s, the EPA’s 
Office of Pesticides and Toxic Substances “exempted formaldehyde from 
designations as a priority chemical under section 4(f) of the Toxic 




121 Id. at 865. 
122 C. Bierstedt, see supra note 110, at 650. 
123 Id. 
124 J. Fraiberg & M. Trebilcock, see supra note 119, at 864. 
125 S. Jasanoff, see supra note 54, at 35.  
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definitively proved that this substance causes cancer in rats.”126 The risk 
management measures seemed to have been unduly influenced by the 
concerns of the formaldehyde industry.127 Within the shale gas context, 
this instance resembles the US Vice President Dick Cheney’s leadership 
of a taskforce which exempted Halliburton Company, of which he was 
the former CEO, from fracking wastewater disposal under the Safe 
Drinking Water Act. Such regulatory moves are now known as the 
“Halliburton Loophole.”128 The resulting regulatory vacuum at the 
federal level has generated inconsistent state regulatory regimes, in 
which only a fraction of states endeavor to resolve fracking fluid disposal 
issues. As a result, “a variable regulatory terrain” has been created with 
“many significant gaps unfilled.”129 
 
ii. Fracking risk management uncertainty 
 
There is a difference between risk and uncertainty. Risk indicates 
that the likelihood of possible future events is known and defined. 
Uncertainty, on the other hand, signifies that the likelihood of a future 
event has not been or cannot be measured.130  
As previously discussed, fracking impacts on water resources fall 
within those situations where risk assessment is inconsistent and 
uncertain. Where risk assessment uncertainty exists, policy judgments 
are necessary to fill in the gaps.131 Therefore, risk managers are called to 
adopt the best policies to deal optimally with uncertainty. When 
addressing uncertainty, regulators not only have to determine its 
parameters, but also the impacts of any assumption adopted to deal with 
the uncertainty on the society, economy, and the environment.132 
When uncertainty is inevitable, certain risk managers tend to adopt 
conservative risk assessment assumptions thereby leading to 
conservative risk-management decisions.133 It is noteworthy that the 
choice to be conservative in risk assessment is ultimately a risk 





128 C. Morrison see supra note 57, at 100. 
129 M. Burger see supra note 10, at 1494. 
130 J. Fraigberg & M. Trebilcock, see supra note 119, at 879-880. 
131 Ellen J. Case, The Public’s Role in Scientific Risk Assessment, 5 GEO. INT’L ENV’T. L. 
REV. 479, 499 (1993). 
132 Id. 
133 J. Fraigberg & M. Trebilcock, see supra note 119, at 856. 
134 Id.  
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     Additionally, risk managers may resort to conservative positions 
irrespective of any risk assessment assumptions. This can be exemplified 
in the fracking risk management context, by the statewide outright 
fracking bans adopted by a number of states, such as New York and 
Vermont, as they were faced with insufficient knowledge about fracking 
impacts on the environment. 
Risk assessment conclusions as to whether or not fracking is safe are 
neither conclusive, nor provide us with facts about the probability of 
occurrence of certain accidents under certain conditions. The decision 
that determines the level of acceptable risk – the probability of water 
contamination – is still beyond the scope of risk assessment and belongs 
more properly to the domain of risk management.135  
The subsequent section explores the level of conservatism for which 
the regulatory authorities opted, in crafting fracking risk management 
policies, taking into account fracking risk assessment uncertainty. 
 
II. FRACKING RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT AT THE FEDERAL 
AND STATE LEVELS 
 
This section analyzes fracking risk management tools at the federal 
and state levels. It further addresses the extent to which risk management 
and risk assessment should optimally interact in furtherance of water 
resource protection from fracking potential threats. Despite the fact that 
risk assessment remains inconclusive as to fracking’s potential impacts 
on water resources, fracking risk management is exempted from most 
federal laws and regulations. This has led to the emergence of a spectrum 
of inconsistent state laws and regulations, which range from a laissez-
faire approach to outright statewide bans on fracking.  
 
A. The Federal Oversight 
 
1. Historical overview of fracking-risk assessment at the 
federal level 
 
The 1980 Amendment to the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA) exempted several types of solid wastes from regulation as 
hazardous wastes, including “drilling fluids, produced waters, and other 
 
135 See generally H. Wiseman, see supra note 34; See also Wiseman alluded to the state of 
New York stating that New York’s position toward shale gas activities relied on 
“incomplete set of data,” see supra note 104, at 816. 
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wastes associated with the exploration, development, or production of 
crude oil or natural gas or geothermal energy.”136 
Section 8002(m) of the amendment requires EPA to study these 
wastes and to submit a final report to Congress.137 The EPA conducted 
and submitted a report in December 1987, known as the 1987 report. The 
report also addressed the “adverse effects of such wastes on humans, 
water, air, health, welfare, and natural resources […].”138  
The report recommendations were not confined to whether Congress 
ought to continue with the application of RCRA Subtitle C to exempted 
wastes or uphold the current exemption; rather, the report analyzed the 
risks posed by the improper management of oil, gas, and geothermal 
wastes, which may adversely affect and cause damage to public health or 
the environment.139 It bears pointing out that the report was of general 
scope and not specifically designated to evaluate risks generated by 
fracking wastes. 
Additionally, the EPA acknowledged the limits of the 1987 report 
conclusions due to a lack of data necessary for risk modeling and risk 
assumptions.140 The report recognizes that “the limited amount of waste 
sampling data and the lack of empirical evidence on the probability of 
injection well failures have made it impossible to estimate precisely the 
absolute nationwide or regional risks from current waste 
management.”141  
It is important to note that comprehensive information on the 
exempted wastes from oil and gas operations is not routinely collected 
nationwide. Rather, the information relied upon in the report was 
 
136 See 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(A)—(B) (1982); see also OFF. OF SOLID WASTE AND 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE, EPA/530-SW-88-003, REPORT CONGRESS: MANAGEMENT OF 










137 Report congress: management of waste from the RCRA, see supra note 138, at I-7.  
138 Id. 
139 Id. at I-8. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at V-64. 
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collected by the American Petroleum Institute (API) and the injection, 
production, and hauling reports conducted by state agencies.142 
In the guise of a general conclusion, the report states: 
 
For the vast majority of model scenarios evaluated in this 
study, only very small to negligible risks would be 
expected to occur even if the toxic chemical(s) of concern 
were of relatively high concentration in the wastes and 
there was a release into ground water as was assumed in 
this analysis. Nonetheless, the model results also show 
that there are realistic combinations of measured chemical 
concentrations . . . and release scenarios that could be of 
substantial concern. EPA cautions that there are other 
release modes not considered in this analysis that 
could also contribute to risks. Also there are almost 
certainly toxic contaminants in the large unsampled 
population of reserve pits and produced fluids that could 
exceed concentration levels measured in the relatively 
small number of waste samples analyzed by EPA.143 
 With respect to risks associated with produced water disposal in 
injection wells, the report concluded that the prevalent risks for 
underground injection stem from either grout seal or well casing 
failures.144 However, the report recognized that “other possible release 
pathways such as migration through unplugged boreholes or fractures in 
confining layers, . . . could be of concern.”145  
 The 1987 report recommended that “the imposition of RCRA 
Subtitle C regulation for all oil and gas exploration, development, and 
production wastes to be unnecessary” and “impractical.”146 First, 
“unnecessary” because damages and risks posed by oil and gas 
operations result from violations of existing State and Federal 
regulations. According to the EPA, the enhancement of existing 
authorities, the improvement of the state programs, and existing Federal 
initiatives relating to underground injection and surface water risks, are 
adequately designed to manage oil and gas wastes.147 
 
 
142 Id. at I-4. 
143 Id. at V-64. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at VIII-12. 
147 Id. 
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Second, “impractical” because of the substantial (possibly 22%) 
reduction in gas and oil production in the US should Subtitle C 
regulations be enforced.148 The 1987 report was relied upon to exempt 
the oil and gas exploration and development wastes from RCRA Subtitle 
C. This remains applicable to the fracking waste and will be further 
discussed in the ensuing section. 
In the early 2000’s, in response to public concerns about potential 
impacts on the drinking water from shale gas fracking, Congress directed 
the EPA to study the relationship between fracking oil and gas and 
drinking water in the U.S.149 In 2004, the EPA undertook a study that 
assessed the potential for contamination of underground sources of 
drinking waters (USDW)150 from the injection of hydraulic fracturing 
fluids into coalbed methane (CBM) wells.151  
The 2004 study was limited at least in two respects. First, although 
the study alluded to steps in the fracking other than fracking wastewater 
injection that can contaminate the underground drinking water, it fails to 
fully analyze these stages.152 Second, the study analysis was limited to 
CBM wells and did not include other hydraulic fracturing practices, such 
as those for petroleum oil and gas.153 
The 2004 study found that there is “no conclusive evidence that 
water quality degradation in USDWs is a direct result of injection of 
hydraulic fracturing fluids into CBM wells and subsequent underground 
movement of these fluids.”154 Interestingly, the 2004 study was criticized 
for using existing data and not undertaking further investigations, and 
hence missing out on the opportunity to conduct an independent risk 
assessment study rather than merely building its conclusions upon 
existing literature.155 
The conclusions of the 2004 study underpinned the 2005 
Amendment of the Safe Water Drinking Act (SWDA), which exempted 
 
148 Id. 
149 Francis Gradijan, State Regulations, Litigation, and Hydraulic Fracturing, 7 ENV’T. & 
ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 47, 52 (2012). 
150 A USDW is defined as an aquifer or a portion of an aquifer that: 
A. 1. Supplies any public water system; or  
2. contains sufficient quantity of groundwater to supply a public water system; 
and  
i. currently supplies drinking water for human consumption; or  
ii. contains fewer than 10,000 milligrams per liter total dissolved solids;  
B. Is not exempted aquifer. 
151 See 2004 EPA Study, supra note 43. 
152 See F. Gradijan, supra note 151, at 53. 
153 Id.  
154 See 2004 EPA study, supra note 43, at 25. 
155 See F. Gradijan, supra note 151, at 54.  
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the fracking fluids underground injection from the scope of the federal 
UIC program under SWDA. This point will be further addressed with 
more details in a subsequent section. 
In 2010, due to the controversy that surrounded the 2004 study, the 
EPA began planning a study of the fracking water cycle to understand 
how different activities affect the quality or quantity of drinking water 
resources and to identify factors that affect the frequency or severity of 
those impacts.156 The EPA rendered the final report in 2016 (hereinafter 
“the 2016 report”).157 
The 2016 report concluded that groundwater resources are 
vulnerable to a combination of activities and factors in the fracking water 
cycle.158 These activities and factors include:  
 
1) water withdrawals for hydraulic fracturing in times or 
areas of low water availability, particularly in areas with 
limited or declining groundwater resources; 2) spills 
during the management of hydraulic fracking fluids and 
chemicals or produced water that result in large volumes 
or high concentrations of chemicals reaching groundwater 
resources; 3) injection of hydraulic fluids into wells with 
inadequate mechanical integrity, allowing gases or liquids 
to move to groundwater resources, and; 4) injection of 
hydraulic fracturing fluids directly into groundwater to 
surface water resources and disposal or storage of 
hydraulic fracturing wastewater in unlined pits, resulting 
in contamination of groundwater resources.159  
 
The report concedes that further conclusions regarding the impacts of 
fracking on drinking water could not be reached owing to data gaps and 
uncertainties.160 
Particularly, data gaps existed with regard to the environmental 
presence and movement of fracking chemicals. The report suggested that 
such gaps may be bridged by standardizing the currently rare practice of 
obtaining water quality data both before and after engaging in 
fracking.161 
 
156 See 2016 EPA’s Study of Hydraulic Fracturing and Its Potential Impact on Drinking 
Water Resources, supra note 46, at 3.  
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 42. 
159 Id.  
160 Id. at 40.  
161 Id. 
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These data limitations precluded the EPA from being conclusive in 
determining whether or not fracking activities adversely affect drinking 
water resources.162 It is worth noting that data gaps and lack of relevant 
monitoring figures are essentially due to regulatory loopholes, which 
omit to require such pre, post, and during fracking water testing. 163 
Requirements for provisions of fracking data as well as fracking fluid 
chemicals disclosure will be further discussed in the ensuing sections.  
The report called for additional efforts to bridge the data gaps and 
increase risk assessment certainty with regard to the prevalence and 
volume of drinking water impacts.164 
Before suggesting a number of solutions to remedy these 
shortcomings preventing the elaboration of more certain and complete 
fracking risk assessment, the ensuing sections discuss the current legal 
and regulatory status quo, both at the federal and state levels, 
highlighting to a greater extent the origin of fracking-related data gaps to 
which the report pointed. 
 
2. Fracking-risk management at the federal level 
 
Because this paper mainly focuses on threats posed by the fracking 
operations to water resources (surface and underground), this section 
examines the major pieces of federal legislation designed to regulate 
hydraulic fracturing effects on water resources. 
Similar to conventional oil and gas, the exploration and production 
of shale gas is regulated by a complex set of federal, state, and local 
laws.165 At the federal level, the EPA takes on the responsibility of 
administering the federal laws. At the state level one or more regulatory 
agencies issue well related permits covering various aspects like “design, 
location, spacing, operation, and abandonment, in addition to 
environmental activities and discharges, including water management 
and disposal, waste management and disposal, air emissions, 
underground injection, wildlife impacts, surface disturbance, and worker 
health and safety.”166 
The federal legislative arsenal related to shale gas development and 
water resources protection include 1) the Safe Drinking Water Act 
 
162 Id. 
163 Teodore IV Bosquez, Daniel Carmeli, Jeremy Esterkin, Mae Kieng Hau, Kenneth 
Komoroski, Camarin Madigan & Matthew Sepp, Fracking Debate: The Importance of 
Pre-Drill Water quality testing, 26 ENV’T. LITIG. 7, 7, 9–10 (2015). 
164 Id. at 41. 
165 See J. Adams, supra note 7, at 578. 
166 Id. 
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(SDWA) which addresses the subsurface fluid injections; 2) the Clean 
Water Act (CWA) which deals with the surface water discharges; 3) the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability 
Act (CERCLA) which provides for the cleanup of historic contamination 
by hazardous substances; 4) the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA) which sets forth federal standards for the management of 
hazardous wastes from the stage of generation to the disposal; 5) the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)  which mandates a 
comprehensive assessment of the environmental effects of shale gas 
extraction on federal land, and; 6) The Emergency Planning and 
Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) which facilitates and ensures 
access to information and statistics in order to foster a positive feedback 
mechanism that allows the exercise of greater pressure on local or central 
government to enforce existing regulations.167 
 
a. Safe Drinking Water Act  
 
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) was enacted in 1974, with 
“its ‘general purpose to assure that water supply systems serving the 
public meet minimum national standards for protection of public 
health.’”168 The SDWA regulates the underground injection activities 
with the goal of “protect[ing] groundwater resources, including 
underground drinking-water supplies.”169 
Under the SDWA, the EPA oversees at the federal level the safety of 
the groundwater resources through the Underground Injection Control 
(UIC) permit program.170 
As far as the hydraulic fracturing is concerned, in 1997, a Federal 
Court171 interpreted the SDWA as applicable to “underground injection 
of fracking fluids.”172 Under the SDWA, the EPA undertakes a 
“minimum inspection, monitoring, record keeping and reporting 
requirements for state Underground Injection Control (UIC) 
 
167 Id. at 579, 582, 585.; “…Congress enacted EPCRA as a comprehensive regime requiring 
companies to disclose information related to the storage and use of hazardous and toxic 
chemicals,” see Burger, supra note 10, at 1521. 
168 M. Burger see supra note 10, at 1503. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 1504. 
171 See Legal Env’t Assistance Foundation v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467, 1478 (11th Circuit 
1997). 
172 D. Callies & C. Stone, Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing, 1 J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 11 
(2014).  
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programs.”173 All underground injections are prohibited unless exempted 
or permitted.174  
In the event a state chooses to take control of the enforcement of the 
UIC programs, it may apply to the EPA to be granted statutory 
responsibilities.175 “Once approved, states are primarily responsible for 
issuing injection permits and monitoring the effect of injections on the 
quality of” the underground water resources.176 A state seeking EPA 
approval must develop a UIC program which safeguards drinking water 
from any potential dangers due to injections, as well as guarantees of 
sufficient oversight measures.177 Failure to secure the approval of a state 
UIC program or in the event of incompetent management, federal control 
and management may step in.178 
Consequently, under the ordinary and plain meaning of the SDWA 
provisions, hydraulic fracturing would have come under the scope of the 
statute. In other words, there is nothing in the ordinary and plain 
language of the SDWA that supports the exclusion of hydraulic 
fracturing. Thus, the state UIC programs would have made the issuance 
of permits obligatory for the injection of fracking fluids.179 The “oil and 
gas injection wells—including the so-called ‘enhanced recovery’ wells 
like fracking wells—are regulated under the federal UIC program’s Class 
II requirements.”180 In Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation, Inc. 
v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, the Eleventh Circuit 
rejected the EPA’s interpretation, which argued that the “underground 
injection” did not include hydraulic fracturing operations.181 The 
Eleventh Circuit held that SDWA required the regulation of hydraulic 
fracturing alongside the traditional underground injection forms.182 
In 2005, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act (EPAct), which 
carved out the operations associated with the shale gas exploration and 
extraction from the scope of the SDWA.183 The EPAct “amended the 
definition of ‘underground injection’” to “exclude ‘the underground 
injection of fluids or propping agents’” associated with the hydraulic 
 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 12.    
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 11–12. 
178 Id. at 12–13. 
179 See M. Burger, supra note 10, at 1504. 
180 Id.  
181 Legal Env’t. Assistance Found., Inc. v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467, 1478 (11th Cir.1997).. 
182 Id. at 1477–1478. 
183 M. Burger see supra note 10, at 1504.  
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fracturing operations.184 Pursuant to the exclusion, only injection of 
diesel requires a prior UIC permit.185 The EPAct also indicates that the 
regulatory framework governing fracking activities would from then on 
fall within the state permitting and enforcement structures.186 As a result, 
unless the gas drillers inject diesel fuel underground, “they are not 
required to seek a permit, or to disclose any of the chemicals in their 
fracking fluid under federal law.”187 
The UIC permitting under SDWA relies on predictive models in 
determining the endangerment standard, which yields a risk-based 
evaluation of a proposed operation during the permitting process.188 The 
outcome of the evaluation would give rise to one of the following 
decisions: 1) a prohibition of the activity without a permit, or 2) 
establishment of a standard for permit issuance that requires the applicant 
to demonstrate that the underground injection will not endanger drinking 
water sources.189 
The SDWA was envisioned to “foster a ‘cooperative effort in which 
the Federal government assists, reinforces, and sets standards for the 
State and local efforts’ in implementing the Act.’”190 Nonetheless, the 
exemption of injection of the fracking fluids from the scope of the 
SDWA enabled the individual states to assume the enforcement of  their 
own UIC programs.191 As it will be addressed in further detail in the 
ensuing section, the states’ UIC programs generally do not restate the 
SDWA endangerment standard.192 
The absence of “a federal floor of minimal regulation in permitting 
shale gas extraction” fueled the debate over whether states should be 
trusted with the environmental management and control.193  
State oil and gas development statutes are infused with broad 
language that leaves sufficient room for state agencies to promulgate 
necessary rules to prevent any undesired environmental impacts of the 
shale gas extraction.194 Yet, more often than not the state agencies fail to 
 
184 Id. 
185 Id.  
186 See E. Collins, supra note 69, at 117. 
187 Thomas Hooker, Zoning Out Fracking: Zoning Authority under New York State’s Oil, 
Gas and Solution Mining Law, 40 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 869, 876 (2012). 
188 See E. Collins, supra note 69, at 125-126. 
189 Id. at 125; see also 42 U.S.C. §300h(b)(1)(A) (2013) and 42 U.S.C. §300h(b)(1)(B). 
190 Id. at 128. 
191 Id. 
192 See infra section II. 2.  
193 See Emily A. Collins, supra note 69, at 118. 
194 Id. at 126. 
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put in use the discretion they were granted.195 In fact, unlike the SDWA, 
with the exception of Illinois’s statute, no state has an oil and gas statute 
at the permit application phase that  “(1) clearly puts the burden on the 
applicant to show that their proposed operation is safe, or (2) describes 
the level of acceptable risk of contamination of water supplies.”196 
The fracking fluids’ exemption from the scope of the SDWA has 
been criticized as “bad environmental policy.”197 For instance, 
EarthWorks contented  that the exemption makes “oil and gas the only 
industry allowed to inject toxic fluids directly into good quality 
groundwater without oversight by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency.”198 
As mentioned above,199 this exemption has been referred to as the 
“Halliburton Loophole” given that it “was pushed through Congress by 
Vice President Dick Cheney, a former chief executive of [Halliburton, a 
multinational oil and gas company].”200 Knowing that fracking was 
invented by Halliburton in 1947, critics insinuate that EPA would have 
not abdicated the authority of regulating fracking activities to the states 
“but for inappropriate interference of corporate interests.”201 
 
b. Clean Water Act 
 
The Clean Water Act (CWA) governs “unpermitted discharges of 
soil, chemicals or other materials to wetlands or surface waters.”202 
“Since 1987, drilling operations have been exempted from storm water 
runoff provisions of the CWA.”203 Additionally, a CWA amendment 
made fluids generated by the hydraulic fracturing fall outside the scope 
of the “pollutant” category: “the term ‘pollutant’ . . . does not mean . . . 
(B) water, gas, or other material which is injected into a well to facilitate 
production of oil or gas.”204 As a result, the CWA only comes into play 
 
195 Id.   
196 Id.  
197 Matt Willie, Hydraulic Fracturing and Spotty Regulation: Why the Federal Government 
Should Let States Control Unconventional Onshore Drilling, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1743, 
1761 (2011).  
198 See Wiseman, supra note 35, at 145 n.156 (quoting EARTHWORKS, OIL & GAS 
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING, available 
at http:// www.earthworksaction.org/pubs/Fracking.pdf). 
199 See discussion supra I.2.b.i.  
200 See C. Bierstedt, supra note 110, at 659. 
201 Id.  
202 See D. Callies & C. Stone, supra note 174, at 21.  
203 Id. 
204 Id.; See also 33 U.S.C § 1362(6). 
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to regulate the disposal of fracking “flowback or fracking wastewater,” 
other than the underground injection.205 
In Texas, similar to many other states, the “fracking wastewater is 
disposed of primarily by injection into underground storage wells below 
impermeable rock layers.”206 Consequently, because the CWA 
essentially regulates “discharge at the surface level, instead of 
underground injections of fluids, [it] has not historically played a large 
role in the regulation of oil and gas operations” in some geographical 
areas.207 Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that certain geological formations, 
including the Marcellus Shale region, are not appropriate for 
underground disposal, which may explain the existence of fewer 
injection wells in that region.208 As a result, treatment of fracking 
operation flow-back water in publicly owned treatment works (POTW) is 
“more common.”209 This makes the provisions of the CWA of greater 
relevance within certain geographical areas when compared with others. 
Put differently, the CWA’s applicability to fracking fluids disposal 
depends on the geological characteristics of the shale gas formations at 
issue, which in turn vary widely across states and jurisdictions. 
The CWA endows the EPA with the power to set wastewater 
standards for industries as part of pollution control programs.210 “They 
have also set water quality standards for a variety of contaminants in 
surface waters.”211 The CWA provides that the discharge of a pollutant 
into the water of the U.S. requires a permit from either the EPA or the 
authorized state agency, and that the discharge is in compliance with the 
CWA-based National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES).212 
“Shale gas production sites or commercial facilities [taking on the 
responsibility of handling the] ‘disposal or treatment of shale gas 
produced water must obtain permits if they intend to discharge directly 
into the surface waters.’”213 Also, the CWA provides that indirect 
disposal of fracking wastewater through POTW by discharging directly 
into waters in the US falls within the jurisdiction of the EPA.214  
 
205 See D. Callies & C. Stone, supra note 174, at 21. 
206 R. Reser, supra note 29, at n. 18. 
207 D. Callies & C. Stone, supra note 174, at 21. 
208 R. Reser, supra note 29, at n. 18.  
209 Id. 
210 Adams et al., supra note 7, at 580 (citing 33. U.S.C. §1251).  
211 Id. 
212 R. Reser, supra note 29, at 98. 
213 Adams et al., supra note 7, at 580. 
214 R. Reser, supra note 29, at 98-99. 
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Granting a NPDES permit, either by the EPA or an authorized state 
agency, requires the consideration of technology-based effluent limits 
and the water quality-based effluent limits.215 In sum, “states are 
generally delegated primary enforcement authority with regards to the 
CWA, following the EPA’s approval of the state program.”216 
 
c. Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and 
Liability Act  
 
CERCLA “is a retrospective law designed to provide for the cleanup 
of historic contamination by hazardous substances.”217 CERCLA 
provides for the creation of a ‘Superfund’ with the goal of financing 
“government remedial actions.”218  
Under CERCLA, contaminated sites can be cleaned up either by 
state or federal government authorities, or responsible private parties 
(either voluntarily or under a government order).219 Under CERCLA, 
federal and state governments and certain private parties can bring claims 
against “potentially responsible parties” (PRPs) on the grounds of their 
release of  hazardous substances.220 Section 104 (e) of the statute 
empowers the EPA “to investigate the site and any alleged PRP” in the 
event of identification of a contamination site.221 Subsequent to the 
investigation, the EPA is authorized under section 106 to order PRPs to 
undertake certain remedial actions.222 However, CERCLA turns to be of 
little relevance to fracking waste management since in defining 
“hazardous substance” for establishing a potential PRP’s liability, 
CERCLA excludes “petroleum, including crude oil, . . . natural gas, 
 
215 R. Reser, supra note 29, at 98-99; see also Adams et al., supra note 7, at 580-81 
(“Effluent limitations serve as the primary mechanism under NPDES permits for 
controlling discharges of pollutants to receiving water. When developing effluent 
limitations for an NPDES permit, a permit writer must consider limits based on both the 
technology available to control the pollutants (i.e. technology-based effluent standards) 
and the regulations that protect the water quality standards of the receiving water (i.e. 
water quality-based effluent standards). The intent of technology-based effluent limits in 
NPDES permits is to require treatment of effluent concentrations to less than a maximum 
allowable standard for point source discharge to the specific surface water body. This is 
based on available treatment technologies, while allowing the discharger to use any 
available control technique to meet the limits.”).  
216 R. Reser, supra note 29, at 98. 
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[and] natural gas liquids.”223 This exemption is of particular importance 
to the oil and gas industry.224 
From another vantage point, because the hydraulic fracturing fluids 
may include other substances than the ones exempted, CERCLA 
empowers the EPA to issue remedial orders, instructing operators to 
redress contamination associated with the fracking fluids.225 
 
d. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act  
 
The provisions of subtitle C of RCRA sets forth “the federal 
standards for the management of hazardous [solid] wastes” from the 
stage of generation to disposal.226 The RCRA establishes stringent 
safeguards and waste management procedures in regulating hazardous 
solid wastes.227 
Under the RCRA, the EPA may entrust the execution and 
enforcement of hazardous solid waste regulations with the states only 
when the state programs meet the federal regulations level of 
stringency.228 The stated overarching goals driving the enactment of the 
RCRA were essentially to ensure that:  
 
(1) It provides uniformity among the states as to how 
hazardous wastes are regulated. (2) It provides industry 
and commercial establishments that generate such wastes 
uniformity among states, (3) by providing such 
uniformity a state with environmentally sound laws does 
not drive business out of the state to a state which, for 
economic reasons, decides to be a dumping ground for 
hazardous programs equivalent to the federal program, 
the police power of the states that are [sic] utilized rather 
than the creation of another federal bureaucracy to 





225 Id. (“Following an investigation, CERCLA section 106 authorizes the EPA to order a 
PRP to undertake certain remedial actions.”).  
226 M. Burger supra note 10, at 1521. 
227 R. Reser, supra note 29, at 99. 
228 M. Burger supra note 10, at 1522–23. 
229 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, at 30, reprinted in 1 ENV'T & 
NAT. RES. POL’Y DIV., CONG. RSCH. SERV., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL ACT, AS AMENDED, TOGETHER WITH A SECTION-BY-
SECTION INDEX 585, 558, 591 (COMM. PRINT 1991).  
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In 1980, Congress temporarily exempted wastes from the oil and gas 
exploration and production from the RCRA’s federal hazardous waste 
regulation until the EPA determined later whether to include said 
wastes.230 Such a decision was justified by the fact that allegedly some of 
the EPA regulations governing drilling fluids, produced waters, and other 
oil and gas exploration and production wastes “could have a significant 
economic impact” on the industry, and further information on the degree 
of risk and the efficiency of existing state and federal programs was 
required.231 
In 1988, based on the EPA 1987 report,232 the agency recommended 
that the federal regulation of oil and gas exploration and production 
wastes under the RCRA was unnecessary.233 Therefore, the EPA has 
never listed fracking waste as “hazardous waste.”234 The position taken 
by the EPA “was premised on its finding that alternative regulations 
were infeasible, state regulations were adequate, and the economic harm 
suffered by the oil and gas industry would be severe.”235 
As a result, even though the fracking fluids include toxic chemicals, 
which would normally be regulated by the RCRA, the fracking operation 
wastes fall outside the scope of the statute.236 
In 2010, several environmental groups represented by the Natural 
Resource Defense Council requested the EPA regulate hazardous waste 
created by exploring and producing oil and gas.237 Additionally, the 
petition demonstrated that fracking produces hazardous waste and that 
there are significant gaps in existing state regulatory regimes that 
necessitate federal intervention to fulfill the statute’s purposes238  
 
e. National Environmental Policy Act 
 
NEPA’s general purpose is to set forth national goals for the 
protection, maintenance, and enhancement of the environment.239 Within 
 




234 C. Morrison, supra note 57, at 100.  
235 M. Burger supra note 10, at 1523. 
236 R. Reser, supra note 29, at 99. 
237 M. Burger supra note 10, at 1525. 
238 Id. (RCRA’s overarching concerns–providing nationwide protection from hazardous 
wastes and promoting uniformity among the states–would best be served by rescinding the 
regulatory exemption). 
239 “The purposes of this Act are: To declare a national policy which will encourage 
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environmental; to promote 
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and 
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the context of shale gas operations, NEPA imposes “a thorough 
environmental impact analysis” for activities taking place on federal 
land.240   
NEPA provides for three levels of environmental risk assessment 
requirements: 1) activities that fit within a categorical exclusion enjoy a 
low level of review or risk assessment requirements due to these 
activities’ insignificant impact on the environment; 2) an environmental 
assessment is required when there is a need to determine whether an 
activity necessitates an environmental impact statement; and, 3) an 
environmental impact statement, which is a comprehensive risk 
assessment tool that provides alternative actions, addresses unavoidable 
effects, and suggests other stringent requirements.241  
Strikingly, the EPAct (2005) exempted certain oil and gas activities 
from stringent environmental review under NEPA.242 Also the EPAct 
specified that the oil and gas related activities, including fracking, fall 
within the categorical exclusion standard, which is the lowest level of 
scrutiny required by NEPA and does not allow public comment.243 In line 
with EPAct policy, the US Bureau of Land Management exempted oil 
and gas companies who lease federal lands from the environmental 
impact statement.244 
 
f. The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act 
 
The public’s access to information and statistics leading to rising, 
informed, public awareness and greater pressure on relevant authorities 
may play a major role in improving the enforcement of environmental 
laws and existing regulations.245  
These transparency measures can contribute to filling data gaps in 
connection with the oil and gas industry in general and with respect 
fracking activities specifically.246  
 
stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological 
systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on 
Environmental Quality.” National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
190, § 2, 83 Stat. 852 (1970). 





245 Paolo D. Farah & Riccardo Tremolada, A comparison between Shale Gas in China and 
Unconventional Fuel Development in the United States: Water, Environmental Protection, 
and Sustainable Development, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 579, 622 (2016).  
246 Id. at 623. 
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Passed in 1986, the EPCRA was intended to urge information 
disclosure with the goal of facilitating both decision makers and the 
public’s access to relevant data, in addition to motivating fracking 
operators to diminish or stop hazardous or toxic chemicals’ release.247 
Under this statute, companies are under the obligation to file annual 
reports on the amounts of toxics released into the environment, or else 
recycled, treated, or disposed of in landfills.248 The reports are accessible 
online through the database called the Toxic Releases Inventory (TRI).249 
The TRI is a searchable database maintained by the EPA, to inform and 
guide policy decisions of local communities and federal government 
about the toxic releases and waste-management activities.250 
The statute only provides for the facilities in the manufacturing 
sector to file the reports with TRI; however, the EPA has the authority to 
add additional industry sectors at its discretion to the statutory list. 251 
Similar to chemicals utilized in other oil and gas activities, the chemical 
composition of fracking fluids is carved out from the scope of EPCRA.252 
Hence, U.S. Shale gas companies are not required by federal law to 
disclose the chemicals being used for hydraulic fracturing.253 
In 2012, a number of environmental groups led an initiative, known 
as the “Environmental Integrity Project”  calling  the EPA to place the oil 
and gas extraction industry on the list of those entities obligated to 
disclose toxic releases under the TRI.254Among the elements that the 
EPA should weigh is whether disclosure by facilities within the oil and 
gas industry will increase the amount of information available or 
“otherwise further the purposes of [the] EPCRA.”255 In examining this 
factor, the EPA’s TRI analysis asks whether existing state and voluntary 
information disclosure rules provide adequate information to satisfy the 
EPCRA’s purpose.256 
Interestingly, eleven states where fracking operations are occurring 
have not adopted disclosure requirements, while the other half require 
drilling companies to reveal some, but not all chemicals used for 
 
247 M. Burger supra note 10, at 1526. 
248 Sheldon Leigh Jeter, The Role of Risk Assessment, Risk Management, and Risk 
Communication in Environmental Law, 4 S.C. ENVTL. L. J. 25, 46 (1995). 
249 Id. 
250 P. Farah & R. Tremolada, supra note 247, at 623. 
251 Jeter, supra note 250, at 46. 
252 42 U.S.C. § 11004(a)(2)(B) (2006 & Supp. 2012); M. Burger, supra note 10, at 1527. 
253 P. Farah & R. Tremolada, supra note 247, at 624. 
254 M. Burger supra note 10, at 1527. 
255 Id. at 1528. 
256 Id. at 1526. 
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fracking.257 However, it is worth stressing that, Congress did not 
expressly exclude fracking from the scope of the EPCRA. In fact, it is a 
matter of proper implementation of the EPCRA. Simply put, it is up to 
the EPA to add the fracking industry to the TRI.258 
Within the same context, it bears pointing out that there is no federal 
law or regulation that governs the disclosure of the chemical ingredients 
added to the fracturing fluids.259 The composition of fracturing fluids 
differs according to the characteristics and nature of the formation at 
issue; in general, the fluid contains mostly water, proppants (e.g. sand - 
to keep the fractures open), and a small percentage of chemical 
additives.260  
Some of these additives have been characterized as “hazardous to 
health and the environment.”261 For instance, the Shale Gas Production 
Subcommittee of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board “has 
recommended public disclosure of all of the chemical ingredients added 
to the fracturing fluids,” while according a certain degree of protection to 
trade secrets.262  
However, there are 15 states that enacted chemical disclosure laws, 
half of which require direct public disclosure of chemical information on 
the FracFocus chemical disclosure website.263 Few states give the 
disclosing parties a choice of either submitting the information to a 
publicly-accessible website comparable to FracFocus or to a state 
agency.264 Additionally, the disclosure’s timing and level of the detail 
vary from state to state. While a number of states impose the submission 
of material safety data sheets (MSDSs) for certain chemicals, the level of 
 
257 P. Farah & R. Tremolada, supra note 247, at 623. 
258 M. Burger supra note 10, at 1529. 
259 R. Reser, supra note 29, at 99. 
260 Id. at 93, 101. 
261 Id. at 101–02.  
262 Id. at 102. 
263 R. Reser, supra note 29, at 102 (State regulations which require disclosure of chemical 
information on the FracFocus chemical disclosure website include: The Code of 
Colorado Regulations (Colo. Code Regs. §404-1:205A(b)(2)), North Dakota 
Administrative Code (N.D. Admin. Code 43-02-03-27.1(1)(g), (2)(h)), Texas 
Administrative Code (Texas Admin. Code §3.29(c)(2)(A))); see also BRANDON J. 
MURRILL, CONG. RES. SERV., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENTS 5 (2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42461.pdf. 
264 Louisiana Administrative Code provides that the operator must make disclosures to 
the state agency or “furnish a statement signifying that the required information has been 
submitted” to the FracFocus site or a comparable registry, so long as “all information is 
accessible to the public free of charge.” see LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, § 118(C)(1), (C)(4); 
see also B. MURRILL, supra note 263, at 5.  
37
Abid: Reflection on Shale Gas Fracking Risk Assessment and Management i
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2020
Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 
37 
disclosure remains low.265 A number of state laws provide that “at least 
some disclosure of information about fracturing fluid chemical 
composition be disclosed” before fracturing takes place.266 It is worth 
noting that such requirements of  disclosure of fluid chemical 
composition before fracturing rather than afterward turns out to be of 
limited usefulness.267 This is because the chemical mixtures of the 
fracturing fluids are adjusted as the process progresses.268 As a result, the 
disclosures provided before the fracturing stage “may not accurately 
reflect the actual chemicals that will be used.”269 
The disclosure of the chemicals’ identities before and after the 
fracturing operations helps establish the chemicals baseline present in the 
water prior and after the gas extraction activities.270 By comparing the 
“baseline testing results” before the start of the operations with the 
results from post-fracking operations, an eventual “groundwater 
contamination” as well as its potential source will undoubtedly be 
detected with greater certainty.271 From another perspective, in case of a 
spill or release, the prior knowledge of the fracking fluids chemicals 
would facilitate the mission of responding to and containing the 
emergency.272  
 
B. A Spectrum of Inconsistent State Fracking Approaches: From 
“Laissez Faire” to Outright Statewide Bans 
  
It follows from the above section that the federal government 
currently exempts most fracking activity from regulation and thus states 
are free to regulate practices as they see fit.273 For this reason the bulk of 
fracking regulation has been crafted at the state level. There currently 
exists a patchwork of state regulations, where each state enacts various 
 
265 R. Reser, supra note 29, at 102. 
266 Id.; Kentucky requires some disclosure at the permitting phase (805 KY. ADMIN. 
REGS.1:110 (2008)); see also Jeremy. I. Maynard, Fracking the Oil and Gas Trade 
Secrets of the Marcellus Shale Natural Gas Play, 6 KY. J. EQUINE AGRIC. & NAT. 
RESOURCES L. 161, 174 (2013). 
267 R. Reser, supra note 29, at 104. 
268 Id. at 104. 
269 Id.  
270 Id. at 103. 
271 Id. at 104 (citing AM. PETROLEUM INST., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OPERATIONS 
WELL CONSTRUCTION AND INTEGRITY GUIDELINES §10.2 (2009), http://www.api.org/-
/media/Files/Policy/Exploration/APIHFl.ashx). For more information on this 
issue, see MARY TIEMANN & ADAM VANN, CONG. RES. SERV., NO. R41760, HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING AND SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT ISSUES (2015). 
272 Id. at 103–04.  
273 See supra II. 1. 
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requirements for wastewater disposal, underground injection, water 
supply acquisition, drilling, casing and operating wells.274 The various 
state fracking regulations fall along a spectrum from outright statewide 
bans to a laissez-faire approach.275 This panoply is best exemplified by 
New York, Illinois, and Texas’ fracking-related regulations. While New 
York is currently enforcing a statewide fracking ban, Texas has a long-
standing fracking-friendly regulation, and Illinois stands in the middle of 
these two extremes by having enacted one of the most comprehensive 
regulatory frameworks governing almost all aspects of fracking. 276 
This section explores first (1) arguments advanced for trusting the 
states with regulating shale fracking operations, then turns to a (2) 
detailed analysis of the fracking regulations in the three chosen states.  
 
1. Arguments for trusting states with undertaking fracking risk 
assessment and management  
 
Proponents of “spotty” fracking regulation at the state level advance 
a number of arguments in support of such a stance.277 First, 
commentators on this side of the debate argue that more local and 
specialized regulation is better. This is primarily because the fracking 
technology is almost always geologic and region specific.278 Thus, 
additional federal regulation becomes unnecessary and potentially 
problematic if it conflicts with state controls.279 Opponents of re-
establishment of a federal oversight on fracking activities argue that the 
states already provide for extensive environmental protections. They 
further consider that establishing a uniform system at a federal level 
would not only paralyze the state-centric system (which, they claim, has 
been working for decades without remarkable issues), but also creates 
overlapping controls, slowing down domestic oil and gas production in 
addition to generating a one size-fits-all technological solution to fields 
of diversified geological characteristics.280 Additionally, it has been 
argued that the state officials are generally better equipped and more 
informed about local and regional production techniques than federal 
regulators.281 
 
274 See infra II. b. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. 
277 See generally M. Willie, supra note 199. 
278 Id. at 1772. 
279 Id. 
279 Id. at 1775–78. 
281 Id. at 1772. 
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Many also give the example that Congress struggled to craft 
effective mining legislation, despite the widespread expansion of 
national environmental protections throughout the last century because 
the geological and regional differences encouraged a state-centric 
regulatory scheme.282 Such argument is advocated to be equally pertinent 
to the oil and gas industry.283 Decentralization adopts risk-management 
tools that are tailored more narrowly to specific local risk assessment 
data and more responsive to particular geographical environmental 
conditions.284 
In line with these thoughts, commentators argue that fracking 
operations are either benign or hazardous depending on the shale 
formation.285 Thus, the stringency of fracking regulation should vary 
according to the shale location and characteristics.286 Therefore, it is 
argued that the fracking risk management decisions ought to be left to 
state policymakers and state regulatory agencies, who are better placed to 
take into account the importance of the geological dissimilarities 
between shale formations.287 
Furthermore, as a result of the wide variety of geologic and regional 
specificities, the fracking fluids vary by field and formation.288 For 
instance, fracking operators in Montana have been reportedly using 
“mostly gel water sand frac[k], with the gel consisting of a drilling mud 
or polymer.”289 However, reports show that the fracking wastewater 
generated at the Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale is unexpectedly highly 
rich in radiation.290  
Political accountability is another reason to favor state regulation 
because federal regulators are presumably less sensitive to local concerns 
mainly because bureaucrats reside far away from the shale gas 
formations subject of their federal directives.291 It is strongly argued that 
decentralization generates decisions that are more democratic and more 
responsive to local preferences.292 
 
282 Id. at 1773. 
283 Id. at 1774–75. 
284 Id. 
285 Id. at 1775. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. at 1775. 
288 Id. at 1774. 
289 H. Wiseman, supra note 35, at 141. 
290 Don Hopey & Daniel Malloy, Radiation in Fracking Fluid is a New Concern, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 28, 2011), https://www.post-
gazette.com/local/region/2011/03/01/Radiation-in-fracking-fluid-is-a-new-
concern/stories/201103010626. 
291 M. Willie, supra note 199, at 1773. 
292 M. Burger supra note 10, at 1491–92 (arguments supporting decentralization). 
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Additional rationales may corroborate the rhetoric opting for 
decentralization of fracking regulations. Numerous states may act as 
“laboratories of democracy” or experimentation to enhance innovation 
and creativity in resolving fracking-related issues.293 Decentralization 
might encourage inter-jurisdictional competition, which can lead to 
economically efficient regulation or even “a race to the top.”294  
In the section below, the analysis of fracking regulations in three 
different jurisdictions demonstrates that the current state-centric system 
is replete with shortcomings. State approaches towards fracking varied 
dramatically from an outright statewide ban to a relaxed regulatory 
framework.295 These approaches range from unnecessarily stringent 
regulations to regulations replete with regulatory gaps. Additionally, the 
various state approaches fail to promote the collection of fracking related 
data needed for more certain fracking risk assessment studies, and thus 
more informed risk management decisions.296 
 
2. Comparative analysis of state fracking regulations 
 
This section explores fracking legal and regulatory frameworks in 
three states in the US, namely (a) New York, (b) Texas, and (c) Illinois. 
Each of these three states falls at a different position of the 
aforementioned spectrum, ranging from “laissez faire” (Texas) to 
outright statewide ban of fracking activities (New York). 
 
a. New York 
 
The Marcellus Shale in the State of New York is deemed as “one the 
largest shale formations in the country.”297 The type of natural gas found 
in this formation is thermogenic gas.298 It was determined that drilling 
vertical wells (i.e. conventional drilling method) into these formations 
was not an economically viable choice. 299 Thus, advanced technology 
(i.e. horizontal drilling) was needed to render the development of shale 
gas cost-effective.300  
 
293 Id. 
294 Id. at 1492. 
295 See infra II. b. 
296 M. Burger supra note 10, at 1528–29. 
297 D. Callies & C. Stone, supra note 174, at 28. 
298 T. Hooker, supra note 189, at 872. 
299 Id. at 873. 
300 Id. 
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In 2009, the US Geological Survey assessed the Marcellus Shale at 
84 trillion cubic feet of undiscovered, technically recoverable natural 
gas.301 Other estimations consider the Marcellus Shale as the second 
largest volume of captured natural gas in the world and that it holds 489 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas.302 It is noteworthy that “the total annual 
rate of gas consumption in the US is only 25.5 trillion cubic feet.”303 
New York Governor David Peterson imposed a statewide 
moratorium on fracking in December 2010.304 At the outset, it is worth 
précising the difference in meaning among the terms used such as 
moratorium, ban, and legal or executive moratorium or ban. A 
moratorium refers to a temporary suspension of a specific activity, 
whereas a ban imposes a general prohibition by legal means.305 A 
moratorium by law, or ban by law, is ban or moratorium that is approved 
by the legislature, whereas political ban or political moratorium is 
established by the executive branch.306  
Fracking activities became one of the hottest political, legal, 
environmental, and commercial debates throughout New York State due 
to rising public concerns about the immense amount of water needed 
which must be disposed of, the little knowledge available about 
chemicals used for fracking, and the impacts of these factors on water 
resources.307 The proximity of the Marcellus Shale to the New York City 
and Syracuse Watersheds ignited public concerns that the fracking fluids 
injected into wells would contaminate drinking water.308 
In July 2008, Governor Paterson directed the NY Department of 
Environmental Conservation (DEC) to update its 1992 Generic 
Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS) which governs oil and gas 
drilling in New York State (known as the supplemental GEIS, or 
SGEIS).309 In September 2009, a draft of the SGEIS was released for 
 
301 See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., USGS RELEASES NEW ASSESSMENT OF GAS RESOURCES 
IN THE MARCELLUS SHALE, APPALACHIAN BASIN (August 23, 2011), 
https://archive.usgs.gov/archive/sites/www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp-
ID=2893.html.  
302 C. Bierstdt, supra note 110, at 645; see also Kelsey L. Hanson, Hey New York. You 
Can Frack: An Examination of How Liquefied Petroleum Gas Sidesteps New York’s 
Fracking Ban to Provide a Legal and Practical Approach for Horizontal Drilling in New 
York’s Marcellus Shale, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 375, 378 (2017). 
303 K. Hanson, supra note 304, at 378. 
304 D. Callies, & C. Stone, supra note 174, at 28. 
305 RUVEN FLEMING, SHALE GAS, THE ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY SECURITY 112 (Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2017). 
306 Id. 
307 K. Hanson, supra note 304, at 378–380. 
308 Id. at 379. 
309 Id. 
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public comments.310 The draft included that the “DEC found no 
substantive basis to believe that water quality [would] be degraded in the 
New York City watershed or any other watershed or aquifer.”311  
Before the DEC issued its final SGEIS, the New York legislature 
passed a bill in November 2010 placing a moratorium on all vertical and 
horizontal hydro-fracking until 2011.312 Governor Paterson vetoed this 
bill for being “too broad” and for its potential to “halt hundreds of 
existing, productive vertical fracturing operations that were supporting 
many hundreds of jobs in New York.”313 Notwithstanding his previous 
position, the Governor later signed Executive Order No. 41, which 
instructed further environmental investigation on the issue of fracking 
and “prohibited the DEC from issuing permits for hydraulic fracking 
activities until completion of the SGEIS and the elaboration of a 
regulatory regime specifically designed for such projects.”314 
Importantly even when Governor Cuomo took office in January 
2011, his predecessor’s executive order remained in effect.315 In June 
2012, the DEC was considering permitting fracking activities only in five 
counties in the Southern Tier of New York. Confining fracking activities 
to these areas would have limited fracking operations to the deepest areas 
of the Marcellus Shale rock formation.316 This would have been 
undertaken in an effort to reduce potential risks of groundwater 
contamination.  
The final GEIS of June 2015 eventually provided for a statewide ban 
on high volume hydraulic fracturing (HVHF) across New York state.317 
It was revealed later on that keeping fracking operations out of 
specifically mapped environmentally sensitive areas would reportedly 
have effectively prevented fracking above 63% of the Marcellus Shale 
(the number of wells would be limited to fifty statewide).318 Accordingly, 
a partial ban was deemed justifiable from a cost-benefit perspective. The 
limitation would result in “limited economic and social benefits that 
would be derived from High Volume Hydraulic Fracturing” and hence, 
 




314 Id. at 381 (quoting Peter J. Kiernan, An Analysis of Hydrofracturing Gubernatorial 
Decision Making, 5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 769, 780–81 (2012)). 
315 Id. 
316 Id. 
317 K. Hanson, supra note 304, at 381. 
318 R. Roddewig & W. Hughes, Underbalanced Drilling: Can it Solve the Economic, 
Environmental and Regulatory Taking Problems Associated with Fracking, 49 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 511, 530 (2015); see also K. Hanson, supra note 304, at 381. 
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“the No-Action alternative [was] the only reasonable alternative 
consistent with social, economic and other essential considerations.”319 
Interestingly, the New York DEC relied on a cost-benefit analysis, rather 
than risk assessment analysis, to depart from geographically-limited 
fracking operations.320 
It is also worth highlighting that the final Supplemental GEIS banned 
only High-Volume Hydraulic Fracturing, which uses “300,000 or more 
gallons of water as the base fluid for hydraulic fracturing for all stages in 
a well completion,” not any other type of fracking that uses less quantity 
of water.321  
 
b. Texas  
 
As shale gas fracking is booming in Texas, fracking-related 
“regulation and enforcement appear to be lagging behind.”322 Texas’ 
fracking laws and regulations illustrate the shortcomings of allocating 
primary regulatory authority to the states, without a federal regulatory 
floor.323 In Texas, this has resulted in an alarming legislative and 
regulatory void with respect to water resources protection.324 
 
i. Texas’ deficient UIC program  
 
In the UIC context, Texas Natural Resources Code provides that the 
well construction standards and practices allow the evaluation of harms 
threatening water supplies.325 The state agency (Texas Railroad 
Commission) is also empowered to impose other requirements to curtail 
adverse environmental impacts on ground and surface water.326  
In this context, Texas’ statute provides: 
 
To prevent pollution of surface water or subsurface water 
in the state, the commission shall adopt and enforce rules 
 
319 K. Hanson, supra note 304, at 382 (quoting N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. 
CONSERVATION, FINAL SUPPL. GENERIC ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, 
GAS AND SOLUTION MINING REG. PROGRAM: FINDINGS STATEMENT 1, 5 (2015)).  
320 Id. (quoting N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, FINAL SUPPL. GENERIC 
ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING REG. PROGRAM: 
FINDINGS STATEMENT 1, 2 n. 1 (2015)). 
321 Id. 
322 R. Reser, supra note 29, at 107. 
323 Id. at 106–7. 
324 Id. 
325 E. Collins, supra note 69, at 132. 
326 Id. 
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and orders and may issue permits relating to: 1) the 
drilling of exploratory wells and oil and gas wells or any 
purpose in connection with them, 2) the production of oil 
and gas . . . The commission shall adopt rules to establish 
groundwater protection requirements for operations that 
are within the jurisdiction of the commission, including 
requirements relating to the depth of surface casing for 
wells.327 
 
At the outset, the statute uses a permissive language, suggesting that the 
agency “may issue permits,” hence it is not obliged to undertake any risk 
analysis to protect groundwater. The statute also merely requires uniform 
rules for every gas drilling and production, overlooking the specificity of 
fracking operations.328 
Furthermore, the statute fails to provide minimum standards for 
ensuring the protection of groundwater. In this sense, Texas’ statute does 
not provide for specific conditions related to protection of groundwater 
which would result in the denial of a permit in the event of non-
compliance.329 Texas’ rules and drilling applications do not require any 
additional information that allows the agency to restrict drilling and 
operations if a predictive model shows that water contamination may 
occur at a specific location.330 
Moreover, the drilling application fails to include a clause that allows 
the Railroad Commission to obtain information necessary to model the 
potential for subsurface migration of fluids or methane from gas 
development operations.331 This casts real doubts as to whether the 
current regulations assure the conduction of adequate risk assessment 
associated with the drilling operations. 
Texas’ statute focuses more on well construction rules to ensure 
protection of groundwater. Nonetheless, the statute fails to expressly and 
clearly require the state to evaluate risks associated with the 
contemplated fracking operations prior to issuing a permit. 
Texas agency’s regulations and drilling application do not require the 
provision of any additional fracturing data, despite the breadth of the role 
attributed to the agency on protecting groundwater under Texas statute’s 
language. This data is extremely important for the agency to deny 
 
327 Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. §§ 91.101 (a)(1)-(2), 1015 (West 2013) (emphasis added). 
328 E. Collins, supra note 69, at 132. 
329 Id. 
330 Id. at 133. 
331 Id. 
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drilling and operations if a predictive model shows that adverse 
environmental impacts are imminent.332 
 
ii. Failure to regulate the use of potable groundwater for 
shale gas fracking activities 
 
Chapter 36 of the Texas Water Code exempts the use of potable 
groundwater for an oil and gas exploration permit.333 This exemption 
means that fracking operators are allowed “to drill as many water wells 
as they want and use as much fresh groundwater as they need with few 
restrictions or guidelines.”334 No permit is required for pumping fresh 
groundwater so long as this water is used for oil and gas activities.335 
Strangely enough, a permit is only required when fracking operators use 
brackish water.336 The Railroad Commission issued only 33 of such 
permits in 2012.337 
 
iii. Shortcomings of Texas’ chemical disclosure law: Texas 
House Bill 33228 
 
In 2011, Texas enacted the House Bill 3328, which required 
operators of fracking activities to disclose the chemical composition of 
their fracking fluids.338 Nonetheless, the statute includes an exception for 
chemicals classified as trade secrets. 339 Therefore, the Texas Railroad 
Commission must determine a process for fracking operators to 
“withhold and declare certain information as a trade secret.”340 
Additionally, the chemical disclosure requirement provision does not 
apply retroactively, hence, the fracking operations that commenced 
before February 1, 2012, are not subject to the disclosure requirement.341 
Therefore, “hundreds of thousands of pre-existing drilling operations are 
 
332 Id. at 132. 
333 R. Reser, supra note 29, at 105–06.  
334 Id. at 106. 
335 Id. 
336 R. Reser, supra note 29, at 106. Brackish water (less commonly brack water) 
is saltwater and fresh water mixed together. It is saltier than fresh water, but not as salty 
as seawater. It may result from mixing of seawater with fresh water, as in estuaries, or it 
may occur in brackish fossil aquifers. See Brackish Water, EUROPEAN ENV’T AGENCY, 
https://www.eea.europa.eu/archived/archived-content-water-topic/wise-help-
centre/glossary-definitions/brackish-water (last visited Aug. 27, 2020).  
337 R. Reser, supra note 28, at 106. 
338 K. Watson, supra note 30, at 352. 
339 See Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 91.851(a)(3) (West 2011 & Supp. 2012). 
340 K. Watson, supra note 30, at 352. 
341 Id. at 365. 
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not required to disclose the components of the fracking fluid used in their 
well” regardless of whether or not the chemicals are trade secrets.342 
Texas HB 3328 presents a number of deficiencies. The Bill initially 
required the approval of the Railroad Commission in order for an 
operator to obtain trade secret exemption from the disclosure 
requirement.343 However, the final enacted version omitted the upfront 
requirement for the Commission’s approval of the trade secret claim.344 
Rather, the enacted statute directed the Commission to prescribe a 
process whereby an operator can claim the components are a trade 
secret.345 The Commission did not prescribe a process that scrutinizes the 
credibility of an operator’s claim for trade secret protection; rather, the 
Commission prescribed a process that lists limitations applicable to 
potential challengers of an operator’s trade secret claim.346 In other 
words, an operator does not need the approval of the commission to take 
advantage of the trade secret exemption from the disclosure requirement 
under HB 3328, whereas a challenger to the trade secret protection must 
comply with a number of conditions, including: 1) a 2-year statute of 
limitations, and 2) the challenger must be the landowner, an adjacent 
landowner, or a government agency.347 No authority is tasked with 
overseeing operators in respect of the requirements for trade secret 
claims, while restrictions are imposed on the challengers.348 
Additionally, the Commission would request an operator “to 
substantiate its trade secret protection claim only after a challenge to the 
claim has been asserted.”349 Simply put, the fracking operators are not 
required to proffer evidence in order to claim trade secret protection; 
rather, evidence is only requested when the claim is challenged.350 
Hence, Texas HB 3328 offers fracking operators the opportunity to 
easily circumvent the disclosure requirements.351 Such regulatory 
relaxation is concerning as it encourages a significant number of 
exemptions to be claimed (in 2012, one year from the enactment of the 
disclosure law, fracking operators claimed 10,000 exemptions).352 
 
 
342 Id. at 365–366. 
343 Id. at 364; see also H.B. 3328, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 91.856 (Tex. 2011). 
344 K. Watson, supra note 30, at 364. 
345 Id. at 363; see also H.B. 3328, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 91.853 (Tex. 2011).  




350 Id. at 365; see also H.B. 3328, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 91.853 (Tex. 2011). 
351 K. Watson, supra note 30, at 365. 
352 Id. 
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Furthermore, even the operations that are subject to the disclosure 
requirement must comply with such obligation after the completion of 
the fracking.353 As a result, the fracking chemicals are disclosed only 
after having been used. Environmentalists and the public may 
understandably question the purpose of such a disclosure requirement, as 




Commentators who are in favor of allocating fracking regulatory 
authority to the states often advance the state of Illinois as illustrative of 
the ability of states to adopt fracking regulations that make better sense 
and suit the needs of its citizens.355 This is because, in 2013, Illinois 
passed “a major comprehensive statute to regulate fracking,” the 
Hydraulic Fracturing Regulatory Act (HFRA).356 The HFRA has been 
deemed so far “the nation’s strictest regulations for natural gas 
drilling.”357 
In fact, the HFRA imposes a number of restrictive requirements on 
fracking operators, notably: a high volume horizontal hydraulic 
fracturing permit is required for each fracking well developed;358 all 
chemicals anticipated to be added to or used as hydraulic fracturing fluid 
must be disclosed  in the permit application as well as its concentration 
and “mass;”359 each application for a permit requires a plan for the 
handling, storage, transportation, disposal, or reuse of the fluids, together 
with a traffic management, containment, and plugging and restoration 
plan;360 and water quality monitoring of all water sources likely to be 
affected by the process of fracking.361 In addition to the drilling permit 
required by the Oil and Gas Act, a specific permit for horizontal 
hydraulic fracturing is also required;362 “fracking operations will be 
 
353 Id. at 366 
354 Id. 
355 D. Callies & C. Stone, supra note 174, at 26; see also E. Collins, supra note 69, at 119, 
142–144.  
356 D. Callies & C. Stone, supra note 174, at 26. 
357 Id. 
358 Ill. Hydraulic Fracturing Regulatory Act, 2013 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 98-22 (West) 
(codified in 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 732 (2013)), §1-30 (a). 
359 Id. at §1-35 (8), § 1-35 (8) (c), § 1-35 (8) (d). 
360 Id. at § 1-35 (b) (11), § 1-35 (b) (13), § 1-35 (b) (14), § 1-35 (b) (18). 
361 Id. at §1-80. 
362 Id. at §1-30 (a); see also Illinois Oil and Gas Act, 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 725/6(1) 
(2013), 725/6(2), 725/6.1 (setting forth requirements for drilling permit).  
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conducted in a manner that will protect the public health and safety and 
prevent pollution or diminution of any water source.”363  
It is worth stressing that, under the HFRA, the burden falls upon the 
permit applicant to show the safety of the shale gas development 
operations to the state agency.364 Thus, the high volume horizontal 
hydraulic fracturing operations must at no time pose a threat to public 
health, safety, or the environment.365 This requirement is “completely 
unique to Illinois.”366 
In the UIC context, the Illinois Oil and Gas Act charged Illinois’ 
Natural Resources Department with requiring:  
 
The drilling casing and plugging of wells to be done in 
such a manner as to prevent the migration of oil or gas 
from one stratum to another; to prevent the intrusion of 
water into oil, gas or coal strata; [and] to prevent the 
pollution of fresh water supplies by oil, gas or salt 
water.367 
 
Illinois’ Oil and Gas Act requires developers to obtain a drilling 
permit.368 It further requires that the application for permit provide for 
the well location, the depth, and other information required by the 
Department of Natural Resources.369   
The HFRA added another layer of sophistication to Illinois’ UIC 
program. Not only did the HFRA replicate many of the federal UIC 
regulatory requirements, it added further provisions, notably in relation 
 
363 Ill. Hydraulic Fracturing Regulatory Act, 2013 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 98-22, § 1-53 (a) 
(4), §1-75(a)(2); see also E. Collins, supra note 69, at 142. 
364 Applicants must submit along with the permit application plans and proofs of 
compliance with conditions included in section 1-35 of HFRA. See Ill. Hydraulic 
Fracturing Regulatory Act, 2013 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 98-22, §1- 35; see also §§ 1-53 (a) 
(3) and (4) (providing that a permit shall only be issued “if the record of decision 
demonstrates that… the plans required to be submitted with the application under section 
1-35 of this Act are adequate and effective” and “the proposed hydraulic fracturing 
operations will be conducted in a manner that will protect the public health and safety and 
prevent pollution or pollution or diminution of any water source”). 
365 Id. at §1-75 (a) (2) (providing “[a]ll phased of high volume horizontal hydraulic 
fracturing operations shall be conducted in a manner that shall not pose a significant risk 
to public health, life, property, aquatic life, or wildlife”). 
366 E. Collins, supra note 69, at 142. 
367 255 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 725/6(1) (2013).  
368 Id. at 725/6(2), 725/6.1. 
369 E. Collins, supra note 69, at 142. 
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to “planning and evaluation . . .  of proper use and management of water 
supply quantities.”370  
The HFRA sets forth with great specificity what an application for 
UIC permit must include.371 Importantly, the state may deny an 
application for a permit, if the applicant fails to submit satisfactory 
information.372 The HFRA is clearly “an environmental permitting and 
enforcement statute for shale gas development instead of a traditional 
well location and construction statute.”373 This feature of the HFRA is 
lacking in most oil and gas development statutes in the rest of the states. 
 
III. SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This section suggests and explores solutions at both the structural 
level and substantive level with the goal of enhancing fracking risk 
assessment and management in the US. 
 
A. Structural Solutions to Enhance Fracking Risk Assessment and 
Management 
 
The structural solutions addressed in this section are three-fold: (1) 
shared regulatory authority between federal and state level, (2) creation 
of a national commission for fracking wastewater disposal, and (3) 
establishment of one spot-shop for fracking permits. 
 
1. Shared regulatory authority governing fracking activities 
 
This subsection argues that a shared regulatory authority between the 
federal government and the states would ensure a minimum federal 
regulatory floor that would serve like a safety valve to protect water 
resources from potential threats posed by hydraulic fracturing. 
The controversy surrounding the risks posed by fracking operations 
has been exacerbated because fracking has been exempt, as analyzed 
above, in important ways from several federal environmental laws 
including but not limited to the SDWA, the CWA, the RCRA, the 
CERCLA, and the EPCRA.  
 
370 Id.; see also Ill. Hydraulic Fracturing Regulatory Act, 2013 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 98-
22, §§ 1-35 (b) (10), 1-75 (e). 
371 Id.; see also Ill. Hydraulic Fracturing Regulatory Act, 2013 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 98-
22, §§ 1-35 (b) (6) (C), (E). 
372 Id. 
373 Id. at 142–43. 
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This analysis addresses the question of whether the assessment and 
management of fracking risks should flow from a national or state level 
and seeks to discern which level of governance is most appropriate by 
considering the number of factors. This paper argues that the status quo 
(the state-centric system) does not adequately deal with fracking’s 
potential impacts on underground drinking-water supplies. 
Many analysts advocate that fracking-related risk assessments and 
risk management would be most effective if it came from the Congress 
and the EPA rather than from a patchwork of state regulations.374 This 
would arguably yield a certain consistency and visibility for the fracking 
industry.375 Additionally, regulation at the federal level would “ensure 
that the residents of every state are equally protected from any harmful 
fracking effects.”376 
There are essentially two conceptions of what represents an 
appropriate sharing/division of regulatory authority, namely dual 
federalism, and cooperative federalism.377  
Dual federalism emphasizes the centrality of state autonomy. It 
reflects relation of conflict between federal and state governments.378 It 
views the federal government as one with limited purposes and 
powers.379 Additionally, it maintains that the federal and the states “are 
sovereign within their separate spheres.”380 
Unlike dual federalism, which seeks to divide the US into exclusive 
power domains, cooperative federalism, emphasizes partnership between 
federal and state governments.381  
The advocates of federal minimum oversight call for cooperative 
federalism in dealing with fracking regulations. The cooperative 
federalism emphasizes partnership between the federal government and 
the states, rather than calling for dividing governance into exclusive 
power domains between federal and state authorities.382 Cooperative 
federalism maintains that states and the federal government often operate 
in areas of overlapping authority and jurisdiction.383 
Various arguments in favor of a minimum federal oversight are 
noteworthy. First, fracking’s generation of “interstate externalities” 
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makes a federal response crucial. 384 Second, federalization is likely to 
solve “the problem of the ‘race to the bottom’” in which state and local 
governments compete to give more concessions in order to attract 
fracking companies.385 The federal uniformity in the regulation of 
fracking activities provides economic efficiencies to the regulated 
entities.386 Centralization can pool resources for gathering technical 
information, generating reliable scientific knowledge, creating durable 
rules, and enhancing enforcement.387 Centralization may also enable a 
“different balance of interest group influence.”388 Lastly, federalization 
can attenuate the “not in my backyard” attitude often evident in the 
conflicts surrounding the siting of hazardous waste disposal sites and 
other locally undesirable land uses.389  
States should not be left as free riders in regulating fracking’s 
impacts on water resources. For instance, states that are sensitive to 
fracking waste risks may choose to ban fracking wastewater disposal 
within their states, rather than banning fracking altogether. This policy 
may lead to states lacking strong environmental regulations and pro-
environment politicians in office being the dumping location of fracking 
wastes, including wastewater transported from states with more stringent 
fracking wastewater disposal regulations.390 This is illustrative of the 
situations where the states become vulnerable to political influences of 
the gas industry and economic forces, and compete among themselves to 
adopt lax environmental regulations resulting in the “race to the bottom” 
phenomenon.391 Additionally, the oil and gas industry lobby has 
sigificant sway, especially in smaller state and local areas, making these 
locations particularly susceptible to its relentless search for lower 
fracking wastes disposal costs.392 
In sum, with the proliferation of fracking activities across the US, the 
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2. Creation of federal commission for fracking wastewater 
disposal 
 
Fracking lacks regulation in three main areas: 1) “oversight of and 
accountability for onsite fracking processes,”393 2) oversight of fracking 
fluid chemicals, which are often insulated from disclosure under 
trademarks claims, and 3) monitoring fracking fluids storage and 
disposal, including the underground injection of fracking wastewater in 
underground wells.394 
Therefore, the need seems crucial for the creation of a national 
commission to regulate and enforce the laws governing fracking 
wastewater disposal in the US. Observers propose that the commission 
be named “Fracking Waste Disposal Regulatory Commission” 
(FWDRC).395 
To guarantee effective monitoring, it is recommended that the 
Commission have regional headquarters with short distances from the 
fracking sites.396 
Another factor for the commission to attain its objectives is to 
guarantee its neutrality. In fact, observers deem that the “most crucial 
component of creating any new authority would be minimizing the risk 
of agency capture, whereby those charged with regulating an industry 
actually serve the interests of the industry.”397 The concept of agency 
neutrality is of paramount importance because it deters manipulation of 
the risk assessment and management processes.398  
Scholarship deemed that agency capture stands behind the fact that 
the “federal government’s leadership in fracking regulation has been 
paralyzed.”399 Therefore, in order to efficiently address the fracking-
related risk assessment and management challenges, measures should be 
taken to minimize agency capture. For instance, candidates for the 
position of commissioner who previously worked for the oil and gas 
industry, or owned interest in an oil and gas entity, should be restrained 
from being appointed.400 Another less stringent proposal would suggest a 
“cooling period” where the candidates for the position of commissioner 
should not have worked for an oil or gas entity or have had oil and gas 
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interests for the last ten years.401 Another measure consists of including a 
non-compete clause in employment contracts, which would impede the 
commissioner of seeking jobs in the oil and gas industry at the end of 
their mandates with the commission.402 
 
3. One-stop shop for fracking permits 
 
One of the solutions to achieve more efficient risk analysis with 
respect to authorizing fracking operations is “to create a ‘one-stop shop’ 
for federal fracking permits within the EPA or a state agency that has 
been delegated to implement federal environmental statutes.”403 The 
creation of such a body would help coordinate the permitting process 
under the various applicable federal statutes and deriving regulatory 
requirements, such as the CWA (for surface-level wastewater disposal), 
SDWA (for underground injection of wastewater and underground 
injection of fracking fluid that includes diesel fuel), and the TSCA (for 
disclosure of chemical content), and any probable subsequent 
requirement under RCRA, EPCRA, or CERCLA.404 The same body may 
also grant permits necessary for underground injection of fracking fluids 
in states that require a permit under their UIC programs, similar to UIC 
programs under SDWA.405 Additionally, Congress may revoke the 2005 
EPA Act’s exemption and bring UIC permitting into the same 
consolidated process.406 
 
B. Substantive Solutions to Enhance Fracking Risk Assessment and 
Management 
 
The substantive solutions suggested in this subsection are three-fold: 
(1) repealing fracking exemptions from most of federal environmental 
statutes, (2) setting a federal floor of requisite fracking data at the 
fracking permitting stage, and (3) imposing federal requirements for 
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1. Repealing fracking exemptions from federal environmental 
statutes and regulations: SDWA, CWA, EPCRA, NEPA, 
RCRA, CERCLA, EPCR 
 
Crafting a fracking regulatory framework that strikes a balance 
between the various competing interests appears to be the most adequate 
solution. As analyzed above, a minimum federal oversight of fracking 
activities is indispensable, and thus, the federal statutes should not be 
exempting fracking activities from their scope. To the contrary, the 
existing exemptions should be repealed and replaced with adequate 
provisions that would efficiently govern the fracking activities. 
For instance, Congress should repeal the exemption for fracking in 
the SDWA by crafting a language that makes “underground injection of 
fluids used for fracking” fall within the scope of “underground injection” 
concept.407 Thus, fracking operators injecting fracking fluids in 
underground wells, no matter where their operations are located, would 
be subject the federal UIC’s Class II well requirements.  
 
2. Federal requirement for provision of fracking-related data  
 
At the outset, it is worth stressing that permitting schemes that do not 
require needed information for informative risk assessment do more to 
license harm than prevent it. Therefore, it is recommended that Congress 
imposes the use of predictive models of underground contamination to be 
incorporated into all states’ UIC permitting processes, to ensure fracking 
operations’ compliance with these minimal federal standards.408 
Furthermore, the imposition of baseline water testing and continual 
water testing at regular intervals both during and after drilling is 
recommended. Such practices would provide invaluable empirical data to 
achieve an objective and more certain fracking risk assessment. Water 
testing is not new and has been done in fracking studies, but the testing 
requirement must be imposed by federal law, not left to state legislatures’ 
discretion. In fact, except for Illinois’ HAFRA where water testing is 
required before and during fracking operations, water baseline and 
interval testing is not required by any other state fracking regulation.409 
Additionally, an independent third party must be conducting the 
water testing to ensure the integrity of the results. Federal fracking 
regulations can take a further step by imposing testing of the soil prior to, 
during, and immediately after the fracking operations. 
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If such federal fracking regulatory requirements are followed 
nationwide, this would help monitor levels of contamination, if any 
occurs, over the entire life cycle of the process. Additionally, it would 
achieve greater credibility and certainty with respect to any conclusion 
drawn. 
 
3. Federal requirement for fracking fluid chemicals disclosure 
 
In order to enhance transparency within shale gas exploration and 
extraction operations, we propose that fracking operators be under the 
obligation to timely and effectively disclose the composition of fracking 
fluids used, including any chemicals mixed therein. The proposed 
solution is two-fold. First, fracking operators will be under the obligation 
to disclose the complete composition of the chemicals used in the 
exploration and extraction operations. The disclosure must occur prior to 
conducting any fracking operation and post completing the operations. 
The level of detail of the disclosure and the timing are of paramount 
importance to ensure that chemical disclosure obligation achieve its 
goals. Therefore, this recommendation emphasizes the need for public 
disclosure of all of the chemical ingredients added to fracking fluids, on 
a well-by-well basis. Also, it is worth emphasizing that the disclosure 
must take place prior to conducting any fracking operations and post-
completion of the fracking within a predetermined time frame, such as 
within 30 days. 
Second, trade secret protections must not strip the fracking chemical 
disclosure obligation of its efficiency. The requirement for detailed 
chemical disclosures may conflict with proprietary rights pertaining to 
the chemicals used. Therefore, the trade secret protections should be 
crafted and interpreted restrictively. Additionally, the Commission in 
charge must prescribe a process to determine whether a fracking 
operator’s claim for trade secret protections should be upheld. 
Additionally, the process must make sure that any withheld information 
associated with the chemical composition of fracking wastewater should 
be conveyed to a third party (e.g. recyclers) acquiring the fracking 
wastewater for purposes of disposal or treatment. The owner of the 
fracking wastewater and the acquiring party, to whom the waste is 
transferred, may enter into a non-disclosure agreement, confidentiality 
agreement, or any other equivalent agreement. The agreement may 
provide for a damages recovery remedy in the event of a breach of the 
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Hydraulic fracturing will remain a hot button issue, and debates in 
relation to this topic will continue to play out in federal and state 
legislatures, agencies, courtrooms, and the front pages of newspapers. 
The analysis of the current state-centric system regulating the shale 
gas fracking reveals critical shortcomings and serious regulatory gaps, 
which justify the rising calls for federal governmental intervention to 
ensure, at a minimum, a federal fracking regulation floor. 
A federal regulatory floor does not necessarily require preemption of 
current state oil and gas statutes; rather, states will continue to enjoy 
primacy over the environmental permitting and the various fracking 
regulatory aspects. This paper simply advocates for a “cooperative 
effort” in which the federal legal and regulatory arsenals assist, reinforce, 
set minimum standards, and step in whenever state and local efforts seem 
to be inadequate. 
At a structural level, this paper recommends that fracking regulatory 
authority ought to be shared by both the federal government and states; a 
national commission for fracking waste disposal should be created; and a 
one-stop shop to be established for the issuance of fracking operations 
permits. 
At a substantive level, this paper suggests that the exemption of 
fracking activities from most of the federal statutes and regulations 
dealing with water resources protection should be repealed. Additionally, 
minimum federal obligations requiring fracking operators to provide 
indispensable fracking data should be established, regardless of whether 
or not they were required to do so under state and local regulations. This 
solution brings a remedy to the fracking data gaps. The availability of 
adequate fracking-related information contributes to greater certainty in 
fracking risk assessment, which leads to more informed fracking risk 
management policies.      
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